5.3 Second, it has confirmed that the most efficient and effective model for running Defence and taking decisions immediately beneath the Ministerial level continues to be one in which the PUS and CDS work together in an integrated Head Office of civilian and military staff, functioning as both the centre of the Department of State and a Strategic Military Headquarters. The allies we have consulted consider this to be a major strength of the UK Defence operating model, and the direction of reform in the French and German Ministries of Defence is towards a more integrated centre. We support that view. We have considered the alternative of organisationally separating the Department of State and the Armed Forces, but we do not recommend it. Separation would create clearer roles, but would introduce extra interfaces and risk incoherence and conflict between the two. Further detail on the proposed functions and structure of an integrated Head Office, and how it should be run, is set out in Part 6 of this report.
5.4 However, our third conclusion is that there is scope to clarify PUS's and CDS's respective roles and responsibilities, including the areas in which PUS or CDS has the lead responsibility. In some respects, what is needed is a re-stating of their existing executive responsibilities, which are not well or widely understood throughout Defence. We believe that the default to decision-making by consensus and through committees has tended to obscure, for example, the significant range of responsibilities of the Accounting Officer and the authority the PUS has in that role. In other respects, though, we believe that adjustments to PUS's and CDS's responsibilities, and how they are discharged, are needed if they are to have the authority they need to run Defence more effectively. Our proposed summary of the primary responsibilities and accountabilities of the PUS and CDS (together with those of the other top posts in Defence) is set out at Annex E to the report, but we would highlight the following:
a. In addition to her traditional Department of State lead on policy advice, PUS is responsible for the formulation and oversight of the Defence programme, where the Department's strategy, available resources and ability to deliver come together. Clearly, this is a key responsibility as the Department seeks to tackle the most significant and pressing managerial problem it faces: bringing and keeping the Defence programme back in line with resources;
b. CDS's role as the principal military adviser will be clarified and strengthened by his membership of the new Defence Board and attendance at the National Security Council. CDS alone will be responsible for representing the military voice. Together with the proposed changes to the Service Chiefs' roles set out in Part 7, this will reinforce and clarify the existing military hierarchy, where we would expect the Service Chiefs generally to provide advice to the Defence Secretary - and now the new Board - through the CDS. This change would not, however, affect the accountability of the Service Chiefs to PUS, in their role as Top Level Budget holders, and to the Defence Secretary for the health of their Service.
c. PUS and CDS both have important roles to play in developing strategy on behalf of the Defence Secretary, and CDS has a particular focus on the development of military strategy as the Strategic Military Commander.
5.5 Guided by our second criterion for the establishment of committees in Part 4, we have also considered whether there are decisions and functions for which PUS and CDS are accountable, but where consultation should be formalised in order for the operating model to function effectively. Our conclusions were that:
• the CDS should continue to convene a Chiefs of Staff Committee to take the military advice of the Service Chiefs on operational matters, including the operational employment of their Service. The CDS should also convene a Chiefs of Staff Armed Forces committee, both to enable and require CDS to understand the Service Chiefs' views on non-operational matters, before attending the new Defence Board. These discussions should inform but not constrain his contribution on the Board; and,
• we recommend that PUS and CDS establish a strategy group, to enhance senior focus on this issue. It should consider how Defence can most usefully engage in the world to deliver foreign and security policy objectives, and should both inform and be informed by the National Security Strategy.