8.17 This system of delegation relies on robust and transparent performance monitoring and management from the Board down. We do not believe the current system of reporting to the existing Defence Board and annual holding to account sessions with TLB holders and process owners will be sufficient for the operating model we propose. We can also see some opportunities to control proposals from process owners that have cost implications and to streamline the system for managing the performance of process owners.
8.18 Our model sees a strengthened role for the PUS in personally holding TLB holders to account and a more active role for the new Defence Board in providing support, guidance and challenge on overall departmental performance.
8.19 Specifically, we recommend that the PUS supported by DG Finance and, where appropriate, the CDS should hold TLB holders to account on a quarterly basis for:
• delivery of specific and pre-agreed objectives within the delegated budget;
• effective management of risk; and,
• compliance with corporate rules and standards set by process owners.
8.20 This process should be objective, evidence based and robust. We are quite clear that, unlike in the Department today, budget holders must be held to account. If their performance does not meet requirements they should be removed from their post. We recommend that the Department does further work on the contractual implications of this but we are in no doubt that mechanisms should be put in place to allow this to happen.
8.21 Similarly we would expect departmental performance (across the range of the Department's business) to be the key issue on which the Defence Board should focus.