9.6 We do not, however, believe that clarification in this way will be enough. The future character of conflict will increase yet further the demand for integrated capability and joint enablers. There is evidence that joint enabling capabilities do not receive the priority they merit in the single Service force structure. We therefore believe there is a strong case for developing a Joint Forces Command (JFC) to deliver output focussed capabilities and capitalise on potential synergies to deliver enhanced joint operational effect.
9.7 As a minimum, the JFC would include the Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ), and many of the assets currently held in the Central TLB (including the Directorate Special Forces, training and delivery units from the Defence Intelligence Staff (with the analysis function remaining in Head Office), the Joint Medical Command, the Defence Academy and the Development Concepts and Doctrine Centre) to produce a coherent military grouping. An initial structure for the JFC, based on this scope, and a list of key responsibilities are at Annex F.
9.8 But we would expect the Department to go further, transferring to the JFC some joint capabilities and functions that currently sit in the single Services. We recommend therefore that the Department should, as part of the implementation of JFC, systematically review joint or potentially joint capabilities and functions across the Services, DE&S and the Central TLB, to determine which might be rationalised, the merit of further joint organisations, and which should transfer to the JFC and which should transfer to a Lead Service. It would make sense for that work to be led by a Commander JFC designate.
9.9 We would expect some additional capabilities or functions to transfer into the JFC at its inception. That is important if JFC is to be set on the right course at the outset. It will then evolve over time through military necessity.
9.10 In this work, the Department may wish to decide whether individual capabilities or functions should be joint using the following criteria:
• is the capability core or non-core to the environment / single Service?
• would the capability or function be delivered more efficiently and cost effectively outside the single Service?
• is it feasible to establish appropriate governance structures to deliver assurance back to the single Service for the delivery of a capability or function on its behalf? and,
• what is the optimum command and control construct to support the capability or function?
9.11 In a small minority of cases, capabilities should be placed in JFC that do not meet these criteria, where experience indicates that it is impractical to expect lead Service delivery due to conflicting interests. However, it should not become the default for capabilities with no other natural home.
9.12 We would also expect that the analysis we recommend above leads to the creation of further joint organisations, which would then sit in either the JFC or a lead Service.
9.13 The JFC should be led at 4 star level. He/she should report to CDS, but, as a TLB holder, would also be accountable to the PUS. The Commander JFC should hold similar status as the single Service Chiefs to ensure appropriate traction across Defence. He/she should sit on the Chiefs of Staff Committee, representing joint requirements on Chiefs of Staff (Armed Forces) and as the proponent for joint effect on Chiefs of Staff (Operations). He should be responsible for:
• the command of allocated joint enabling capabilities in support of operational outputs and increased joint operational coherence;
• joint warfare development to ensure the effective delivery of joint operational capability and increased coherence and balance to Defence outputs; and,
• the integration, support to development and championing of enabling capabilities
• held within the single Services that are brought together for operational employment.
He should be the departmental 'champion' for ensuring joint enablers across Defence are appropriately resourced.
9.14 Commander JFC should command JFC organisations, with single Services retaining Full Command of the Service personnel within them. He should have administrative and development responsibility for PJHQ and Directorate Special Forces (which, like PJHQ, would continue to report to CDS for the conduct of current operations). The budget for allocated joint capabilities would flow through JFC to DE&S in a similar way to the other Commands.