Given the long timescales over which many UK equipments are developed and delivered, there is a significant danger is that the equipment entering service meets a capability need that is no longer relevant to de facto UK defence policy8.
This exact problem was identified in the US acquisition programme by the incoming Obama administration. Announcing the US Defence Budget in April 2009, the Secretary of Defense stated that:
"…every Defense dollar spent to overinsure against a remote or diminishing risk or, in effect, to run up the score in capability where the United States is already dominant is a dollar not available to take care of our people, reset the force, win the wars we are in, and improve capabilities in areas where we are underinvested and potentially vulnerable. That is a risk I will not take…" 9
Criticisms have been levelled against existing UK acquisition plans echo these concerns: the Institute for Public Policy Research (ippr), a UK think-tank, in their June 2009 report on National Security in the UK10 pointed to the following major Defence programmes that in their view required reconsideration: Future Aircraft Carrier (CVF), Joint Combat Aircraft, Type 45 Destroyer, Astute and Typhoon11.
Similarly in 2007, the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI)12 questioned whether these same large platforms, and Nimrod MRA4 in addition, were still relevant to today's asymmetric warfare environment. Furthermore, RUSI questioned whether more cost effective solutions were available to meet the needs that the Department planned to satisfy through the A400m and FRES projects.
In total, the six projects13 whose usefulness was called into question by RUSI account for around 40% of planned spend14 appearing in the Department's EPP over the next 5 years. This figure should not be interpreted as potential savings that are available, but rather an indication as to just how much of current expenditure was originally planned for Cold War style conflict (or goes well beyond realistic, anticipated capability needs). These observations also highlight that it is imperative to ensure that the Equipment Plan remains relevant to evolving capability needs; otherwise, the amount of money being wasted could be immense.
It should be emphasised that the provision of effective, useful defence capability is a very long-term process involving development and coordination of eight different Defence Lines of Development ("DLoDs"). For example, Typhoon was conceived in the early 1970s as a replacement for Jaguar, and if it has a service life of 30 years, it will mean that over 60 years will have passed between its inception and the end of its serviceable life. Naturally, there is uncertainty about the sort of threats the Armed Forces will face over these time-scales10.
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8 Further issues relating to the long acquisition cycle times include risk of technical obsolescence and requirements creep leading to cost inflation.
9 Secretary of Defense Robert Gates Press Briefing, (6 Apr 2009)
10 Shared Responsibilities - A National Security Strategy for the United Kingdom, ippr (Jun 09)
11 ippr stated that Typhoon would have been recommended for reconsideration if the Government had not already committed to Tranche 3
12 The Underfunded Equipment Programme - Where Now?, RUSI Defence Systems (Feb 2007)
13 The spend attributed to the CVF programme includes the MASC project and Type 45 programme includes PAAMS project
14 Based on the PR09 EPP stage 2b post options and manual adjustments