This chapter has outlined a series of issues around the underlying causes of programme overheat and poor performance in terms of project outputs from DE&S. These are interrelated, and it is difficult to ascribe "blame" to one part of the organisation or the other for failings of the system. Specifically:
• current budgetary arrangements allocate the EPP resources in-year to DE&S, rather than the Capability Sponsor as customer. This removes incentives for MoD centre to focus on the performance of the delivery organisation (DE&S) against requirements and encourages extensive changes or delays without responsibility for the consequences on costs or contractual arrangements;
• the acquisition process is partly responsible for system performance problems and DE&S's role in the process is ambiguous:
- it acts in concert with the customer to do its best to provide reasonable outputs from an overall equipment programme that is fundamentally unaffordable, and individual projects that are often unstable in terms of specification and timing; and
- it is also judged both inside and outside the Department for delivery of projects via contracts with industry to time, budget and acceptable performance.
• it is difficult to judge the performance of DE&S on a stand-alone basis because it is providing a "soft" service to the customer in accommodating unrealistic expectations and extensive changes without push back or appropriate contractual change mechanisms; and
• costs of delay or change that arise from programme unaffordability or lack of project "lock down" are not measured in any systematic way. Internal costs (e.g., standing DE&S resources during a project delay) are effectively free goods. External costs may or may not arise depending on the contractual arrangements, although it is likely that excess costs borne by industry will eventually be reflected in future MoD business.