The DPA and DLO were merged in April 2007 in a process that represented a major organisational change. The change was organised quickly and implemented during period of deployed operations yet was completed without major disruption to delivery of capability. This achievement should be seen as a success.
The merger of the DPA and DLO into DE&S created a very large organisation. Although staff numbers have been reduced since 2007, the scope of activities undertaken by DE&S remains very broad. It includes, for example, a much wider range of activities than simply those undertaken by support IPTs, including significant operational, logistical and communications activities.
Whilst some of these activities could be considered "support" activities and whilst they do obtain some funding from the ESP, they are operationally-driven and provide services to Front Line Commands (or, in some cases, services to contractors working for IPTs, e.g., DSDA is a parts storage agency serving contractors that are delivering equipment support activities). As a result, this Review now finds a DE&S organisation where the delineation of activities delivering logistics support to the front line and providing support services (e.g., Naval Bases, JSC) are operationally clear and distinct from those delivering new equipment and procurement of equipment support activity (i.e., DE&S COO area).
The extent to which genuine benefit derives from putting all these activities together in one organisation is unclear. The benefit of grouping the activities was also questioned by the EAC Report, which recommended the transfer of non-core elements such as parts of the supply chain and/or the naval bases (on the analogy of Strike Command's ownership of Main Operating Bases).
The Review has not considered in detail possible changes resulting from "hiving off" activities as described above. Nevertheless, separating these "non-project" activities would, in the Team's view, be the most effective way to focus attention on delivering the changes required to the project delivery activities.
Were the JSC and other support oriented units be separated from the project delivery part of DE&S, it is likely that rationalisation of the overhead and support structures in Abbey Wood would be appropriate. This could include the combination of activities under the Chief of Staff and Chief of Corporate Services, for example, although there are likely to be simplifications and savings beyond this which should be identified and implemented.
DE&S's breadth of operational scope is reflected in its management structure, which lacks focus on the core area of project management for equipment procurement and support. This lack of focus means that it is not structured in the most suitable way to deliver a programme of c.£12bn p.a.99 on equipment procurement and support.
Within COO's area, there is consistency of activity and structure. However, the Review team considers that the span of activity that is currently grouped under a single 3* COO post is probably too extensive.
Whilst the Chief of Materiel role has proven useful to ensure continuity during the organisational transition, there has been confusion surrounding the COM roles (evidenced by COO's note to DE&S staff of August 2008, included at Appendix D), and the Review team's discussions in the first half of 2009 clearly suggest that the continued rationale for the role remains unclear to most of the organisation more than two years after the merger. The Chiefs of Materiel (and supporting organisation) have the potential to create unnecessary distance between FLCs and delivery teams in COO's area (and further exacerbating the reporting burden), without adding significant coordination / delivery assurance ability. Feedback garnered by the Review suggests that the role of the Chiefs of Materiel appears to be a confusing and unnecessary layer in the organisational structure which necessarily imports a further single Service bias into the organisation. At best, the CoMs play only a modest part in procurement and support contracting activities. The Joint Support Chain activities appear to function well with direct interfaces with FLCs; CoMs would therefore appear to be superfluous in facilitating efficiencies in that area.
Finally, and in line with thinking elsewhere on skill requirements appropriate for the task, it would appear obvious that the head of the project organisation should have extensive experience in running project-based organisations of similar size and complexity. Enforcing such a requirement renders unlikely that such an individual could be recruited from within the Armed Forces or the Department.
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99 c.£6bn EPP and c.£6bn ESP.