The scale of the US military acquisition is significantly different to that of any other nation; the number of participants in the process is accordingly larger too. Perceptions of the root problems with the US's acquisition processes are correspondingly divergent. There is, however, common recognition amongst commentators that projects run over time and over budget, and that poor project management performance can be blamed on structural factors including insufficient numbers of appropriately skilled acquisition professionals in the DoD. Although articulated in a variety of different ways, two systemic features are repeatedly cited as problems.
The first is that requirements are often over-specified, which means that immature technologies are too often incorporated into designs. Inevitably, this leads to real challenges in the delivery of a project. The second undesirable feature of the current system that is routinely criticised is the fundamental inability of the acquisition community to provide adequate cost estimates at the outset of a project. An unavoidable consequence of this problem is that projects cannot be delivered to the time, budget and performance criteria set out at initiation.
There is a consensus within the DoD - whether the Defense Secretary, his staff in the individual services128 or the acquisition community itself - that these two problems are critical failures of the US system. Both problems have also been identified by a broad spectrum of commentators outside of the department: the Senate Armed Services Committee ("SASC")129: and its sister committee in the House of Representatives130 recognised them, for instance. GAO special reports in 2006 and 2008 also found that programmes often enter system development with immature technologies and continue past design reviews before design maturity131. The same reports were critical of assurance processes too. Overall, the GAO's damning conclusion was that the system permitted the initiation of programmes with unexecutable business cases, which would inevitably fail. The GAO was also critical of the 'stovepiping' in the capability requirements system, leading to a system that approves 90% of requirements and fosters unhealthy inter-service rivalries, which suggests there should be a greater role for the JROC.
Industry has an even greater number of voices than government but broadly recognises the same core issues and supports the need for acquisition reform along the lines the US government proposes. Its unique slants include the need for more dialogue between industry and government and streamlining of the over-burdensome acquisition process. The Aerospace Industries Association has recommended132 in November 2008 that the new Administration and Congress focus on three themes:
• promote fairness in contracting and financial policies;
• promote reform of the acquisition system; and
• promote competitiveness and efficiency of the Defence and Aerospace industry.
So, the problems with acquisition processes are widely recognised and the need for change generally accepted. In May 2009 President Obama commented that, "we're going to save money by eliminating unnecessary defense programs that do nothing to keep us safe, but rather prevent us from spending money on what does keep us safe." Aside from proposals to scale-back current procurement programmes (such as the cancellation of the $13bn VH-71 Presidential Helicopter program), the administration is seeking to implement organisational change. Indeed, one of the stated objectives for the DoD's 2010 budget is to begin a fundamental overhaul of the DoD's approach to procurement, acquisition, and contracting.
Defense Secretary Robert Gates explicitly placed the trading off of capability and cost at the centre of the New National Defense Strategy133. To inform that trading off, the department's acquisition systems are to focus on three issues134:
• more use of competitive prototyping when appropriate, leading to more mature technology insertion and a better understanding of requirements;
• improved cost estimating, taking into account realistic levels of risk and move away from 'success-orientated' cost estimates that assume 'everything will go right'; and
• conduct technology readiness assessments at each stage of process to ensure technologies are ready before introducing into a new system.
This new focus comes on top of major changes to the processes governing the acquisition process that were announced in December 2008. These changes include:
• the introduction of a mandatory acquisition process entry point, the MDD, to ensure that all available materiel options are considered when solutions to a capability need are first considered135;
• more frequent and effective programme reviews to assess progress - notably two key engineering reviews (the Preliminary Design Review and the Critical Design Review);
• configuration steering boards - implemented to preclude destabilising requirements changes, which have traditionally contributed to increased costs and extended schedules; and
• more effective test and evaluation - test activity integrated into every acquisition development phase.
The DoD has also recently announced plans to increase the acquisition workforce by 20,000 (16%) to 147,000 by 2015 (i.e., back to 1998 levels), including converting 11,000 specialists from contractor support positions to full-time government employees. This initiative aims to readdress the balance of contractorisation after the DoD heavily outsourced its acquisition and contracting operations in the late 1990s to support an increase in workload and a 'sharp decrease' in personnel numbers.
Conclusion: The US recognises the need to put significant effort into improving acquisition performance. There is acknowledgement of the need to use mature technologies more often; improve the acquisition workforce; stabilise funding for major programmes; and improve requirements control (both at outset and during later phases).
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128 Acquisition Improvement Plan, US Air Force (May 2009)
129 SASC Hearing on Acquisition of Major Weapons Systems and the Levin/McCain Acquisition Reform (Mar 2009)
130 House Armed Services Committee hearings (May 2009)
131 'Major Weapon Systems Continue to Experience Cost and Schedule Problems under DoD's Revised Policy', GAO (Apr 2006); 'Fundamental Changes Are Needed to Improve Weapon Program Outcomes', GAO (Sept 2008)
132 'U.S. Defense Acquisition: An Agenda for Positive Reform', Aerospace Industries Association (Nov 2008)
133 'A Balanced Strategy: Reprogramming the Pentagon for a New Age', Robert M. Gates (Jan/Feb 2009)
134 Address to the Armed Services Committee (May 6 2009)
135 Testimony of Deputy USD (AT&L), Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (Sep 2008)