In its allocation of risk and reward, the Pennsylvania deal was quite simple. All the money was to be received as a single one-time payment and there was no arrangement for revenue sharing down the road. Unlike the Indiana Toll Road deal, but similar to the Chicago Skyway, the agreement did not contain a non-compete clause, leaving Pennsylvania free to construct a competing road. Additionally, the concessionaire bore the risk if revenues came in lower than anticipated. Although Turnpike Commission Vice Chair Tim Carson told state lawmakers that the risk to the concessionaire was minimal because of the turnpike's historical, predictable cash flows, ridership on the turnpike fell in 2008.60
Carson also noted the state's inability to quantify all the risks that might arise during the life of the lease. "Over a 75-year period, I think we can all agree that there's the risk of the unknown unknowns," he told legislators. "If we had done this 75 years ago, what would we have put in the concession agreement? I think we could all agree we wouldn't have gotten it all right. And we won't expect to do it now."61
Ultimately, every long-term concession deal will pose questions about risk and flexibility that cannot be easily or immediately answered. It is difficult to know how the needs of drivers and businesses using the turnpike may change over the next several decades. The governor's office believed, however, that under the lease proposal, the state could have forced Abertis/Citi to make changes to the turnpike that policy makers deemed necessary, and Abertis/Citi would have been allowed to increase tolls as a result.62 Abertis/Citi agreed that such changes-along with the associated increase in toll revenue-could be negotiated.63