• There is a need to develop more realistic and accurate traffic forecasts, and, in turn, more realistic financial forecasts. The project encountered serious trouble when the tunnel failed to attract the traffic required to meet interest payments. Even when use was free, patronage was still below the very optimistic forecasts of 90,000 vehicles a day. The low traffic volume was exacerbated by the high cost of the toll-$A 3.56; all these factors resulted in a negative reaction by users.
• Assessment of project bids should include identification of key assumptions upon which success depends. Such critical assumptions should be subject to independent evaluation.
• There is a need to develop better and more flexible pricing models for PPPs. For example, the economic benefit of using a toll road during peak hours is very different from the benefit of using it late at night. Despite the difference in benefit, the driver still pays the same price. By closing down travel alternatives, government removed incentives for the operators to use pricing to attract business.
• There is a need for greater transparency in PPP contracts. Both the private sector and government need to be more open about questions regarding risk and pricing. In a similar vein, there is a need to make the details of the project open to public scrutiny before the project is completed. This did not happen in the Cross City Tunnel project, and the use of a public auditor would have been advantageous.
• There is also a need for governments to pursue PPP projects that are not only profitable, but that also serve to protect (and improve) the public interest.