8. Delays in programmes, and cuts to armoured and protected vehicle budgets, have resulted in gaps in capability.20 Consequently, it became necessary for the Department to rely on additional funds from the Treasury for the rapid procurement of Urgent Operational Requirements (UOR) vehicles at an additional cost to the taxpayer that has now reached £2.8 billion.21 This enabled the Department to procure mine-protected vehicles for troops in Iraq and Afghanistan quickly.
9. We note that some UOR vehicles would have been required even if core programmes had been delivered on time, because of the need for the vehicles in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, the Department acknowledged that delivery failures meant even more UOR vehicles had to be ordered than would otherwise have been the case.22
10. UOR spending has involved the purchase of new vehicles and enhancements to existing vehicles. This included procuring equipment optimised to defeat the specific threats found on current operations, particularly roadside bombs.23 The Department has taken a much more pragmatic approach to delivering equipment through the UOR process and its willingness to compromise on requirements has resulted in the rapid delivery of equipment for operations.24
11. UOR vehicles are typically more expensive, in terms of both initial procurement costs and support costs.25 There have also been issues with the reliability of UOR vehicles, and the Department has only recently met its target to make 80% available for operations.26 Furthermore, because they are bespoke vehicles designed for a specific role, they do not meet the wider requirements of the Strategic Defence and Security Review for flexible and adaptable military equipment, even with further upgrades.27
12 . The Department has stated that it is trying to apply the lessons from the experience of using UORs. For example, the Department is trying to be more realistic about requirements setting so that equipment can be purchased more rapidly. It is important these lessons are applied to the procurement of the next generation of vehicles, such as the Warrior upgrade and Specialist Vehicles. However, the witnesses acknowledged that behaviours have not completely changed within the Department.28
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20 C&AG's Report, para 6 and 12
21 Q20
23 Q86
26 Q16
28 Q54