3.25 In the short term, the Department has deployed a small number of trained service personnel to operate alongside Canadian forces to preserve the United Kingdom's maritime patrol skill sets. The Department also has plans to deploy other personnel to the United States, New Zealand and Australia. Although this is currently being funded through money committed within the Defence budget, in the longer term further investment would be required to maintain this training investment.
3.26 The Department is looking at longer term solutions to fully address the maritime patrol capability gap, due to the short-comings of many of the proposed options discussed above, such as using helicopters and ships. There remain, however, affordability challenges given the over-stretched Defence budget.
Figure 18 | ||
Task | Capability gap with no mitigation | Possible mitigation strategy |
Strategic intelligence tasks | Department would be unable to conduct an element of rapid maritime strategic intelligence gathering, as only Nimrod has the required speed and geographical range. | Very limited capability could be provided by the Sentry surveillance aircraft, but with no ability to gather underwater intelligence on submarines. |
Long-range anti- submarine warfare | Extent to which a capability gap is acceptable depends on assumptions made about future threats, which could be affected by the decision to cancel Nimrod. This includes protection of the nuclear deterrent. | Gap could be partially mitigated by funding additional, or redeploying existing, maritime helicopters, ships and submarines to provide appropriate geographical coverage |
Support to long-range search and rescue and maritime security | Only Nimrod offered speed of response, reach, life raft deployment and long-range communications capability for long-range search and rescue and security operations. The United Kingdom will find it more difficult to meet its international commitments under the Chicago Convention to cover the area to the 30ºW line of longitude. Also impacts on search and rescue for military operations, exercises, submarines in distress, assisting helicopter search and rescue operations and other security tasks. | The Hercules transport aircraft can cover the area to the 30ºW line, but does so more slowly with limited endurance, and has inferior search capability. Merlin, Lynx, and Sea King airborne surveillance and control helicopters, Type 23 frigates and Type 45 destroyers could also be used. In all cases, the Department judges the mitigation would be 'sub- optimal' because none have the range, speed and surveillance capabilities of Nimrod. |
Power projection | Nimrod provided a unique ability to rapidly search large maritime areas, including anti-submarine and anti-surface warfare. Could deploy worldwide at short notice and with minimal initial support. | The Merlin Mk1 and the Sea King airborne surveillance and control helicopters could provide similar capabilities, but speed and range are restricted as the helicopter can only deploy as fast as the ship it is based on. |
NOTES 1 Search and rescue is the responsibility of the Maritime Coastguard Agency. 2 The Sentry E-3D surveillance aircraft was primarily procured as an airborne early warning aircraft but has been extensively employed in the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) role. 3 The Hercules C130J transport aircraft are used primarily to carry troops, passengers or freight. 4 Sea King helicopters are currently used for short-range search and rescue in both the United Kingdom and the Falkland Islands. 5 Type 23 frigates were originally designed for the principal task of anti-submarine warfare but also undertake embargo operations using boarding teams inserted from the ship's boats or helicopter, disaster relief work and surveillance operations. They are to be replaced by the Type 26 Global Combat Ship. 6 Type 45 Destroyer, Lynx Wildcat and Merlin helicopters are described in detail in the project summary sheets in Volume II. Source: National Audit Office analysis of Departmental data | ||