Key findings:

•  the department identified concerns about the design at several stages;

•  during procurement, the department was of the view that its concerns about the design were surmountable;

•  the procurement competition was weak and the department therefore had little scope to use competitive tension to encourage Laser to improve the technical quality of its bid;

•  commercial opportunities to exploit surplus land further reduced the effectiveness of competition;

•  the department wanted to ensure that the private sector remained unambiguously responsible for delivering satisfactory output;

•  the principles of the PFI put considerable emphasis on transferring risk to the private sector for three main reasons:

1.  to provide strong incentives for the private sector to control risks;

2.  to pass each risk to the party best able to manage it; and

3.  to encourage innovation and flexibility by giving the service provider discretion to determine how best to provide the service specified by the public sector.

•  by procuring the new facilities through an output-based specification, the department sought to transfer design risk to the private sector;

•  balance sheet treatment was a major influence on the department's procurement process;

•  the department retained continuity in the project team;

•  the department's estimate of the costs to procure the PFI contract, to manage its obligations during the construction phase, and to meet its residual responsibilities increased from £30 million to £53 million;

•  the department reworked its cost-benefit analysis and concluded that despite the increase in the costs of its residual responsibilities, the project was still value for money;

•  since awarding the contract to Laser in July 1997, the department has spent nearly £9 million on advisers;

•  the department avoided compromising its contractual position

•  as problems evolved the department set limits to its partnering role;

•  by refraining from issuing variations, the department avoided compromising its contractual position on design responsibility;

•  the department kept its options under review;

•  the termination sum was reasonable within the terms of the contract;

•  all parties got less from the project than they had hoped; and

•  when the new facilities are completed the department expects them to meet its requirements.