In some EU countries, the public sector has a poor track record in the maintenance of its infrastructure and buildings. In all cases, the in-depth projects had been completed to a standard at least as high as normal public procurement would have provided, and two Promoters specifically commented that the quality was better than expected. Maintenance costs should therefore be no higher, and possibly lower, than the public procurement alternative. The rationale is that the infrastructure or buildings will be designed for efficient long-term use, because the Provider's return is based on their operation and maintenance. The Provider will also face penalty charges if it fails to hand over a fully functioning asset at the end of the Contract. The standing of maintenance is reinforced by two PPP characteristics. Firstly, the Promoter's budget is pre-committed to the Provider, so maintenance does not have to compete with other demands. Secondly, detailed maintenance requirements are specified in all types of PPP Contract, therefore short-term budgetary constraints within the Provider should not affect maintenance standards. Similar budget arrangements could be applied to traditionally procured projects, of course, but would be difficult to realise in practice. Since the projects evaluated were all quite new, no conclusion could be drawn on whether these long-term benefits would materialise.