NGOs can make a very important contribution to the initial formulation and development of partnerships and service improvement projects in low-income areas. For instance:
• NGO advice in project formulation often leads to more appropriate service responses. Community decision-making is dependent on capacity and communication. Experience suggests that communities making decisions over service options are facilitated by NGO involvement, as NGOs are more familiar with community capacity and needs.
• NGOs can provide knowledge about the appropriate programming and sequencing of activities in relation to capacity building, and can assist in the effective coordination of social, institutional and infrastructure-related activities.
• NGOs often have experience that enables them to understand the role of SSIPs in service delivery, and may be able to facilitate institutional arrangements that bring SSIPs into partnerships rather than marginalise them.
• NGOs will probably be best equipped to understand a community's own resources - such as labour and finances - and how to integrate these into the overall formulation and development of the arrangement.
Box 6.13 Factors Affecting NGOs: The Experience of IIED | |
In Buenos Aires, the local NGO IIED-AL has been involved in poverty reduction activities, and specifically the improvement of water and sanitation services in Barrio San Jorge, for nine years. IIED-AL involvement in service upgrading originated because the government and line agencies did not have the resources or incentive to undertake works in the barrios of Buenos Aires. The network installed in the barrio functioned (and was funded) independently. In 1993, when the Aguas Argentinas (AA) become the concessionaire for water and sanitation network services in Buenos Aires, it did not immediately look to the low-income areas to expand their coverage. Typically, the barrios are informal and poor communities without legal land tenure, living in irregular settlement patterns. Under the contract, AA was responsible for serving only the periphery of the settlement, and then only to legally recognised buildings. However, when AA recognised that it was necessary to start to address the specific problems of low-income settlements, the Barrio San Jorge provided a unique opportunity. In this barrio, AA found three important conditions: a small network had been constructed, NGOs and CBOs were established locally and working together on community development, and the municipality was willing to support the operator's involvement. From its perspective, IIED-AL felt it would be prudent to work with the concessionaire to improve water and sanitation services for the poor, and to promote replication across the barrios of Buenos Aires. The question became 'how' not 'whether' it would be involved. How else were water and sanitation services to the barrios going to be improved? How could AA be assisted in working in low-income areas to the mutual benefit of all parties (the communities, the concessionaire and the government)? The collaboration between AA and IIED-AL functioned on a number of levels; the NGO had two different arms. IIED-AL perceived the arrangement to be somewhat precarious because it had no ongoing contractual arrangement with the operator. In the first stage in 1995, IIED-AL and the community transferred the newly constructed independent water and sanitation network in Barrio San Jorge to AA in exchange for a connection into the city-wide system (the construction cost of the network was US$150,000). Following this, IIED-AL undertook short-term contracts (directly with AA) to undertake specific pieces of work. It was involved, formally and informally, in a number of activities such as promotion of activities in low-income settlements; environmental and social assessments; capacity building of Aguas Argentinas managers; sensitisation of AA staff to work in low-income settlements; explaining the codes of working in low-income settlements; and supporting the community development cell established in AA with an IIED-AL representative. The experience of working with the private sector has been mixed. On the one hand it has been problematic. A level of mistrust and scepticism clouded the perspectives of both parties. The process introduced some risk into the well-established IIED-AL organisation and activities. At times, its reputation was threatened as colleagues in the NGO sector (with little exposure to such private-NGO links) saw IIED's association with Aguas Argentinas as questionable. Many NGOs perceive IIED-AL as working 'for' and not 'with' Aguas Argentinas. This has undermined important collaborations with other NGOs and IIED's role in the local NGO network. Departing from its established activities, IIED had to embrace a number of challenges to work with AA, a process which temporarily destabilised the organisation. Despite these difficulties, IIED-AL concluded that it was worthwhile to help promote the process of institutionalisation of community issues and low-income approaches in a privately-operated utility - especially one responsible for water and sanitation services until 2023. Benefits then became evident. The partnership activities with IIED-AL undoubtedly helped AA to extend services to low-income areas. The lack of explicit extension mandates to low-income areas meant that the operator could opt to delay such improvements for years. The work with IIED-AL, and the confidence this has lent to AA, has meant that more poor people are receiving services (and improvements to the quality of their lives) at an earlier stage, and perhaps more than would otherwise have been intended. AA has also gained the confidence to work with other NGOs, CBOs and consultants. Various lessons have emerged from the IIED-AL experience, each of them instructive for local authorities seeking to focus partnerships on the poor and looking to the NGO sector for support to this end. These include: • Recognising the conflict many NGOs could face if they are to enter into formal or informal associations with the private sector. It is not a simple or natural step for them to take. Many NGOs will resist such a move, and this link may not be possible in the short term. • Considering the nature of the contractual relationship with the concessionaire. NGOs invest their reputation in such a venture. For NGOs with a poverty reduction mandate, this must be accompanied by some commitment from the operator that its work will be used to the benefit and not the detriment of the poor. • Considering, in the long term, how NGOs will be compensated for work that supports the concessionaire. It is essential for NGOs to be involved in, and agree, as many provisions as possible before the contract is signed. Without this it becomes a powerless partner. | |
Source: Developed with IIED-AL | |