Increasingly, initiatives aimed at improving urban services recognise the importance of disaggregating the consumer base, targeting efforts to meet a range of consumer needs and obtaining payment reflective of both the cost of the service standard they receive and their ability to pay. There are at least two types of consumers of basic services in the urban context of developing countries. In the first instance, a fundamental distinction needs to be made between the haves and the have-nots. Non-poor and poor consumers display vastly different service needs and marked differences in capacities that profoundly affect their requirements and their participation in neighbourhood and city-wide delivery processes.
In the main, it is expected that the non-poor should remain detached from the practical implementation aspects of service delivery, pay their bills without incident and behave as informed consumers. However, it is clear that such expectations are inappropriate for poor consumers, and the distinct consumer sub-groups need different structural and process solutions. In the past, this challenge was often avoided. Operators met contractual obligations and prioritised service upgrades for non-poor consumers, as they posed the lowest risks. Alternatively, many projects failed to meet objectives because they made little differentiation between the wealthy and the poor in the organisation of the delivery process and the partners involved. Business approaches have been applied inappropriately in poor communities, or alternatives have been experimental, ad hoc or out-of-contract initiatives.
The fundamental differences between non-poor and poor consumers must be understood in terms of physical, social, political, institutional and economic factors. The most visible is the marginalisation of poor consumers within the city. Although many marginalised and poor households are situated beyond the areas that are geographically defined as slums or squatter settlements, the vast majority are concentrated in underserviced areas on marginal land, often without security of tenure. Typically, network services have not been extended to these areas. Water supply may be communal or illegally obtained, sanitation services may be rudimentary and threatening to personal health and safety, and solid waste services may be non-existent or may not be prioritised. Unlike their wealthier urban neighbours, poor residents often lack access to education, health care and income-earning opportunities. They have been marginalised from the benefits of economic growth elsewhere. Their social status is inevitably low, exacerbated by their inadequate and often unhygienic living conditions. They are generally politically marginalised; they lack access to information and are excluded from most decision-making structures.
On the other hand, non-poor consumers generally have some level of access to services, have jobs and regular income, and enjoy a higher social status - all enabling them to access the services they need. Working with the wealthy is good for business because they can afford a highly transactional relationship in which they simply pay someone to provide a service. Research in many industries has demonstrated that business processes and products can be too expensive for the poor.
Box 6.16 Community Collaborations | |
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Following the introduction of a water concession in Córdoba (see Box 8.8), in 1998 the Municipality of Córdoba collaborated on a number of small pilot projects aimed at connecting poor communities much sooner than was envisaged under the long-term plan for extending the piped network. The pilot projects were carried out as tri-partite arrangements between the municipality, which contributes finance, the water operator, Aguas Cordobesas, which contributes technical assistance, and the community, which contributes voluntary unskilled labour. They have been funded by an investment grant from a special local development fund and a federal job creation scheme, under which long-term unemployed men are able to get work in unskilled labour. Relying on clandestine connections to the piped network, the households of Barrio Estación Flores commonly experienced water shortages and low pressure, and many residents became dependent on water purchased from private tankers. Attempts to obtain legal connections to the network had repeatedly failed, so in 1999 an ad hoc committee, Ente Promotor, was created to access a US$48,000 grant from the municipal fund in order to connect to the piped network. Despite internal problems between this ad hoc water committee and the established CBO, which wished to control the fund, bids were invited, a selection process held and the municipality approved a grant transfer to the committee. The work was carried out using the voluntary labour of the community. Aguas Cordobesas provided an inspector of works. A total of 550 households in 16 blocks were connected with 4500 metres of pipes. The work took longer than originally envisaged because of the need to ensure that all households dug trenches outside their homes. Delays were also caused by disagreements over who was responsible for trenches across streets and crossroads. The committee was successful in reducing the overall cost of the project by ensuring that appropriate materials were used (such as small-diameter pipes) and arguing for lower cost for lower levels of service. (The final cost of the works came in 10% under budget, and was equivalent to just US$78.36 per household connection - less than one-quarter of the standard connection charge of US$350 (including water meter), levied by Aguas Cordobesas on households in the city for work carried out directly by its own contractors. A second example is provided by Barrio Quebracho, a community of 640 households that has acquired a health clinic, primary school and community centre by the efforts of the residents themselves, without any government support. Up until the pilot scheme was launched, municipal and private water tankers supplied households and there were no illegal connections. The typical monthly household water purchase was three 4000-litre units at US$10 each, giving a total expenditure of US$30. Because of the recession, the male unemployment rate in mid-2000 was over 75%. An ad hoc committee was established in 1998 and accessed a US$100,000 grant from the municipal fund. This committee was accountable to the municipality's Department of Community Participation. Two private companies placed bids to supply materials. The municipality purchased the materials from the winning bidder on behalf of the community and these supplies were then deposited. Work was successfully completed by the end of 1999. Aguas Cordobesas supplied two foremen to supervise the work of local residents, which consisted of digging the trenches outside their respective homes, and a number of unemployed labourers taken on for the construction period. 6000 metres of pipe were laid to a depth of 1.2 metres, all using labour-based construction techniques. For many years, households in Barrio San Ignacio had been supplied with water by illegal connections to the piped network. An ad hoc water committee was formed in 1998 and a US$70,000 grant was obtained from the local development fund in order to purchase materials. In mid-1999 some 40 local men employed under the federal job creation programme, Plan Trabajar, began work under the technical supervision of Aguas Cordobesas. However, political divisions within San Ignacio soon led to disputes between the local community organisation and the ad hoc water committee over the management of the project. Accusations arose concerning alleged misuse of the municipal grant. When the Plan Trabajar programme came to an end in December 1999, residents refused to complete the work by providing voluntary labour. By mid-2000 the project was paralysed, with only half of the work completed. The results of these small-scale collaborations have been mixed. Two experienced delays caused by conflicts over the control of funds. The ingredients of the successful projects were that the community participated in the project by supplying voluntary labour, the leadership employed transparency in the management of grant aid, a non-political approach was followed that encouraged the participation of community members in the project, and a centralised leadership was willing to reprimand members who were unwilling to make their own personal contribution to the communal effort. | |
Source: Adapted from Nickson, 2001b | |