Typically, the delivery of infrastructure and services in poor cities is plagued by problems. Both the poor and non-poor have access to inadequate services, which may be infrequent, irregular, unreliable, insanitary and insufficient. In relation to solid waste, poor-quality service may involve littering and dumping in the streets and drains and around neighbourhood or zonal collection points. In relation to water, a low-quality service means that potable water is non-existent, that service is not high enough, is infrequent or unpredictable, or that deteriorating infrastructure results in massive water loss. For sanitation, inadequate quality of service may involve untreated effluent being fed back into rivers and streams, or low collection levels leading to overflowing septic tanks or insanitary operations.
A primary physical objective of municipalities is thus to improve the quality and reliability of services, and the partnership framework needs to describe the scope and content of that improvement. Decision-making over the quality of service will be closely associated with the service coverage and levels. In the first instance municipalities will need to have worked out - in relation to costs - the quantity, quality, frequency, reliability etc. that would fulfil stakeholder objectives.
However, in the context of delivering services to the poor, some service standards will need to be defined in relation to the service demanded, and not some predetermined level. The early stages of developing a service strategy will therefore involve the determination of standards that are appropriate for different groups. In some cases these will be universal (for instance, the quality of drinking water), but in other cases the poor may opt for a different service standard than the non-poor (for instance, less frequent refuse collection, shared taps or on-site sanitation), and the scope for minimum service standards (and the potential options) must be clearly defined at the outset.
The development of the scope and content of the partnership framework will then need to define these specific service goals. This is often achieved through the definition of performance standards that create a basis for determining the acceptability of the service provided or the tasks performed. Depending on the objectives, standards to be defined may include service frequency, quantity, efficiency and productivity, quality, reliability, and expected costs. Many of the performance standards expected of an operator will conform to a norm (national or international) or a goal, but in practice performance standards are simply a means by which a municipality can assess, for instance, whether waste is being collected and transferred at regular intervals, whether complaints are addressed in a timely manner, whether drinking water is of an acceptable quality and accessibility, or whether the level of unaccounted-for water is within an acceptable limit.
Consumers and municipalities should determine the levels of service that are important to them in different sectors. As a starting point for analysis, reference can be made to the international efforts under way to develop common indicators of performance for urban services. These can also provide a useful checklist for any particular municipality's effort to determine locally important performance targets. In the broader picture, the hope is that such consistent measures can then be used to compare performance across service providers and locations, increasing the pressure on operators to perform well.
Performance monitoring aims to measure the performance of services on an ongoing basis to encourage the efficient use of available resources. Performance targets and measurements may be expressed differently depending on the scope of the final arrangement. Some examples of these are indicated in relation to different contract types in Chapter 8. In general, however, best practice recommends that the monitoring of performance should focus on determining whether the outcomes/targets have been met, not constraining operators by prescribing the methods they must use to do so.
Agreement and enforcement of such levels of service will give private partners powerful incentives to ensure that the partnership arrangement leads to improved performance. It is therefore necessary to agree the measurement system - the indicators of performance. The specific indicators will vary from sector to sector - water supply, sanitation, solid waste, energy. Examples of indicators for water and sanitation utilities are provided in Box 7.4, along with those for solid waste operations. At the outset, the definition of the performance standards must be agreed. If agreed, they are then incorporated into a legally binding contract or regulatory requirements. If the standards are not met, action can be taken to enforce legal requirements and public pressure can be brought to bear.
Box 7.5 Community Interdependence | |
A participatory poverty assessment (PPA) carried out in Vientiane, the capital of the Lao People's Democratic Republic, successfully disaggregated the problems and characteristics of poverty and described the different ways that the urban poor in Vientiane experience their poverty. The purpose of this information was to better understand how to formulate the poverty focused components of a donor-funded urban service programme. The following provides an illustration of the type of information that determines approaches to pro-poor service delivery. It is likely that very different solutions would have been developed without this understanding. One of the predominant characteristics of the underserviced areas of urban Vientiane - where many of the poor have congregated - is that these neighbourhoods are heterogeneous. That is to say, the communities in these areas are made up of households with a variety of incomes and livelihoods and the most impoverished and vulnerable households live beside households whose livelihoods are more secure. This has a number of important implications. First, the poor not only have diverse incomes but very different experiences of poverty and vulnerability. Consequently, and unsurprisingly, they have very different priorities. While the 'better-off poor' prioritise housing, services and infrastructure to improve the quality of their lives, the very poor prioritise more fundamental needs such as food, land and jobs. For the purpose of demand-led services and infrastructure improvements this means that there are very different demands within each community, and very different levels of affordability and willingness to pay (WTP). The destitute and very poor are concerned with survival and do not prioritise service improvements. Another, 'middle-poor', group prioritises certain services and may be able to afford minor improvements. However, the income and expenditure analysis suggests that the better-off groups can afford to spend more of their income on the running costs (and capital costs) associated with improved levels of service. It is evident that the some of the better off households are currently paying between 6 and 12% for services. It is therefore evident that a significant number of the households living in the underserviced areas of Vientiane would benefit from and can afford project interventions that enable them to obtain access to better levels of service. However, this heterogeneity has also resulted in significant numbers of households relying on other members of the community. When very poor households suffer from external shocks, such as fires, illness or retrenchment, it is often the better-off neighbours who provide sources of support. The very poor rely on the better-off households for food and services. Most obtain water not from communal sources, but through hoses that connect into the taps of these better-off neighbours. Many obtain electricity by extension leads connected to neighbours. A significant number appear to rely on their neighbour's toilet facilities, whatever they may be. To this extent, services are delivered by low-income private suppliers who have developed an effective and efficient market role. While it is a profitable business approach, dependence may become patronage for the very poor in a crisis. However, this patronage has another face and better-off households are also seen to exploit the poorer households and use service provision as a source of income for themselves. They profit from their investment in metered service connections by acting as informal suppliers of water and electricity and providers of sanitation facilities. Some of these households are the source of high-interest loans for the poorest households in a crisis, a welcome source of funds which incapacitates the poorest even further. The interdependency of the very poor households on the better-off poor means that it is very likely that changes to the levels of service and cost recovery mechanisms will impact on the lives of those who currently do not have that service at all. Interventions cannot be targeted at these better-off households without an impact on other more vulnerable households, especially if cost recovery is involved. In this situation, those making the decisions over household-level improvements are not necessarily the ones who will experience the impacts or shoulder the cost. It is very common, for instance, for landlords to pass on the costs they incur to their tenants through increased rents. It is highly likely that households with connections and facilities that take up the opportunity to make service improvements will pass these costs on to their 'service tenants and customers'. This creates increased insecurity for poorer tenants when they have to move. Project interventions should recognise that the very poor are key stakeholders in the improvements of service to the better-off poor, and that improvements may create instability and vulnerability in the poorer groups. It is also clear from individual household interviews that another scenario exists. In some cases the service suppliers, like some landlords, will be relatively poor themselves, and will rely on the income they receive to supplement income from other sources. Some households, such as female-headed households, may have a water connection dating from a time when they were less vulnerable, and they sell water as a coping strategy. In such cases, providing alternative possibilities for their customers will affect the mechanisms they have developed to survive. Given the interdependent structure of these communities, it is likely that changes to the service provision of one group will have knock-on effects on other poor groups. These may not all be positive. It is therefore essential that the formulation of micro-level interventions addresses the neighbourhood as an interconnected grouping, a linked system of neighbourhood delivery. Service delivery solutions will need to be developed that address neighbourhood clusters as integrated groupings of poorer and better-off households. Given that these processes will be demand-led, this will mean ensuring that mechanisms are introduced which enable the poorest to be heard. Such a holistic approach will ensure that benefits are maximised and negative impacts are addressed. | |
Source: Plummer, 2000b | |