Successful implementation requires monitoring through regular checks and accurate record-keeping to ensure that the intended target groups are being reached, and that the changes are not adversely affecting those least able to bear them - the poorest and most vulnerable households in the community. In many cases municipalities will play the primary monitoring role. The definition of performance standards in the contract is critical for effective monitoring. It will affect how the monitoring is done and by whom. The discussion of performance standards in Chapter 7 highlighted the importance of defining performance standards in terms of outcomes and outputs rather than specified inputs, as this gives the private sector an incentive to innovate and does not hinder the quest for efficiency. It is necessary for the municipality to build capacity for this function and to locate it within the organisation, ensuring that the process is inclusive, transparent and accountable.6
The techniques for monitoring should also be injected with the participatory spirit defined during the earlier stages of developing and implementing the arrangement. In partnerships, it is essential to ensure that all stakeholders play a role in monitoring.
• The private sector and NGOs should have responsibility for evaluating their performances in a transparent way.
• Non-poor and poor consumers will be able to express their satisfaction or dissatisfaction clearly by paying or not paying, or opting out of the scheme if other choices exist.
• Consumers should be given opportunity to feed back their concerns through complaints procedures established by the operator, the municipality or with consumer watchdogs.
The participation of the poor in the monitoring process is less well established in PPPs, but participatory monitoring is critical to a focused partnership. It allows the poor to define in their own terms their concerns about, and the impacts of, the service. Effective participatory monitoring is characterised by:
• a simple, open evaluation methodology;
• a process that is appropriately tailored to a local context;
• the development of contextually relevant indicators, defined by the communities and reflecting their livelihood needs;
• being established well ahead of evaluation with appropriate capacity building; and
• the flexibility to accommodate and facilitate change as community inputs provide direction during the partnership.7
Municipalities that are focused on broader poverty reduction objectives will also be interested in conducting impact assessments. Such assessments should measure, for example, the impacts of improved water, sanitation or solid waste services on poor communities (e.g., the higher attendance of girls in school due to less queuing or reduced distances from water supply, increased home-based economic activity etc.). This will require sound, carefully prepared baselines.
It is also useful to monitor the partnering process so that all the partners can improve the way in which they interact and contribute. This is a less concrete area, but a number of basic questions can help to define the key issues. Is there added value in the partnership? Could these results have been achieved through a restructured and commercialised government provider? Can the impacts of working in partnerships be measured? Is it necessary/possible to measure or evaluate the relationship?
Box 12.5 Management and Monitoring Biratnagar, Nepal | |
A solid waste management partnership with a local private operator has been functioning in Biratnagar in Nepal since 1998. The partnership is a complex set of contracts of various scopes and contents, including a service contract, a franchise and various other ad hoc arrangements. On the municipal side, the three primary actors in the partnership are the mayor, the deputy mayor and the supervising engineer. Strategic aspects of the partnership are managed by the mayor, with contributions from the deputy mayor and the board. Although the original contract was signed and agreed by the former mayor, the present mayor is thoroughly committed to the concept of a partnership for solid waste management and to an increased role for the private sector to achieve effective and sustainable municipal services. Notwithstanding this commitment, management to date has not been informed by experience elsewhere and has not ultimately brought about a sustainable arrangement. To this extent, the partnership lacks strategic management and planning. The coalition nature of the council has also meant that, on occasion, disagreement and debate on policy matters has resulted in compromise and delays in decision-making. The municipal board members are supportive of the partnership arrangement and any disagreements are over minor issues. Despite the fact that the majority of council members are in favour of the partnership, there is still a need to mobilise further support among ward commissioners and members to improve capacity for decision-making. The private operator has been pursuing a contract amendment for some time. The changes proposed address some, but not all, of the inadequacies of the initial contract and begin to address some of the issues threatening sustainability. It is not altogether clear why there have been management delays in finalising this contract amendment. Operational aspects of the partnership are managed by the deputy mayor and supervising engineer. The Monitoring and Evaluation Committee defined in the contract is headed by the deputy mayor and includes the engineer responsible for waste and the general manager of Americorp. Meetings are held monthly to discuss problems and progress, and this has been a helpful and effective vehicle for addressing a number of the routine obstacles facing the partnership. All parties generally agree on the basic parameters and goals. The deputy mayor plays an active role in the day-to-day supervision of the partnership, and stresses that, despite the problems to date, the partnership has introduced and proved the effectiveness of private sector management practices in municipal operations. The municipal engineer in charge of waste is the main liaison point. He believes that the partnership arrangement has had a positive impact on waste operations, although he is aware that his own lack of specialist knowledge in solid waste has limited his ability to understand the technical alternatives and to monitor the contract more effectively. There is, however, very little monitoring as such. In the absence of any performance standards or understanding of the components of systematic monitoring, monitoring is informal and ad hoc. At this stage the only way the municipality judges the performance of the operator is by public complaints, which they receive and pass on to Americorp with the expectation that the problem will be immediately rectified. This is normally carried out satisfactorily: the operator is generally quick and cooperative in solving problems. Most complaints to date have concerned the collection (rather than transfer or disposal) of solid waste, indicating that there has been no visible deterioration of the upstream aspects of the service (transfer and disposal) since the private operator became involved. When this monitoring arrangement is queried, municipal officials point out that the level of performance is not perceived as a problem, and the quality of the service provided is deemed to meet expectations. Indeed, the mayor and deputy mayor both pointed out that prior to the partnership, there had been many complaints from members of the public concerning poor collection and cleaning services in the city, and that the number of these complaints has drastically reduced. One of the key characteristics of the arrangement, and one that differs from the norm, is that the private sector role in municipal solid waste management has not led to a convincing commercialisation of the service. Typically, PSP is associated with improved commercial practices that include long-term planning and the updating of municipal accounting systems that do not capture costs or present grants and transfers in a transparent manner. However, the partnership approach in Biratnagar has not led to strategic planning and budgeting for solid waste services in the municipality; the sector has not been ringfenced, which would isolate the costs to the municipality of providing solid waste services (including direct and indirect staff salaries, vehicles, repair, leases, interest on loans etc); and it has not led to an informed examination of the potential sources of revenue needed to support this improved level of service. Source: Plummer and Slater, 2001 | |