22 The Agency's aim was to relieve congestion and improve reliability through securing a private sector partner to widen the M25. It ran a generally effective and competitive procurement in pursuit of that aim and worked with Connect Plus to obtain financing at market rates during the difficult financing conditions in early 2009. Throughout, the Agency assessed the value for money of the project based on the available information relevant to its specified objective of widening the M25. We note, however, that delays in preparing and finalising the project exposed the project to risk for 18 months longer than expected with the result that it incurred higher financing costs in the credit crisis. This increased the net present cost of the deal by £660 million (24 per cent) to £3.4 billion.
23 In considering the Agency's approach, we looked at whether the Agency could reasonably have been expected to achieve a better outcome, in terms of the use of public funds, to secure increased capacity on the M25 at times of peak congestion. We believe that the Agency could have achieved a materially better value for money outcome by a more agile approach to procurement, recognising the potential cost saving implications of hard shoulder running and keeping the contracting approach open to allow its use. In addition, by driving the whole procurement process forward more promptly, we consider the Agency could, and would, have avoided the cost effects of the financial crisis.
24 The Department acknowledges that the procurement process did extend beyond its 2008 target for signature, which reflected time spent on finalising complex tender documents, on a limited rebid, and on the finance competition during the credit crisis. However, the Department does not accept that hard shoulder running is simply a lower cost solution, but is one that offers materially lower benefits for the reduced cost. Ministers deliberately chose to provide higher benefits and pay the higher costs given the M25's strategic importance.