1.13 London Underground's senior management was concerned that dropping a unified structure could reduce safety levels. Although appropriate safety procedures and accountabilities could be set out in a way that satisfied the safety regulator (the Health and Safety Executive), London Underground remained concerned about how to ensure that safety was not undermined by poor communications between businesses.
1.14 From the start of the PPP process, the working group considered the issue of safety as paramount. Maintaining or bettering London Underground's good safety record was considered central to the Government's objective of safeguarding the public interest. The Department said that attainment of safety standards was to be a pass/fail test and started consultation with the Health and Safety Executive in June 1997.
1.15 In October 1997, the Health and Safety Executive reviewed Price Waterhouse's report on business structures. It concluded that none of the options posed insoluble safety problems, but noted that the potential for loss of safety was greater in the more sub-divided business options because the risk of management failures increased. Later, in March 1998, the Health and Safety Commission confirmed that the proposed horizontal split of the Tube could be made to work safely.
1.16 The Department considered that the objective of safeguarding the public interest argued for retaining operations in a single, publicly owned entity, with overall responsibility for safety including oversight of the Infracos' safety regimes. The Department also saw advantages in this option as, from the perspective of passengers, it would preserve a single unified Tube - with one fare system and one company selling tickets and marketing the service. The Department considered that the recorded improvements in London Underground's operating performance both in terms of customer focus and operating profits over the preceding seven years was evidence of its ability to manage operating costs and collect fares within agreed budgets (see Figure 4).