3.2 The PPP involved an extensive corporate reorganisation leading into a massive procurement exercise. This meant London Underground's management and in house specialists had to break new ground and faced very heavy work loads during peaks of procurement activity. The Department made funds available, which it increased as a consequence of project delays, to mobilise external help and expertise. These funds were generally used to good effect.
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| External Advisers costs to London Underground | |||||
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| External Advisers | Firm | Cost £ million | |||
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| Legal (with LT legal team) | Freshfields | 29.2 | |||
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| Commercial (part financial) | Price Water house Coopers | 21.4 | |||
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| Reorganising operations | Arthur Anderson | 13.8 | |||
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| Reorganising engineering activities & dynamic simulation model1 | PA Consulting | 12.5 | |||
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| Engineering | Ove Arup | 6.0 | |||
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| Project management, audit, insurance, property, pension and miscellaneous technical advice | Hornagold & Hills, KPMG and more than twenty-five other firms | 26.5 | |||
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| Aggregate to April 2003 | £109 million2 | |||
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| NOTE 1 The PA model attempts to simulate the performance of the PPP using, where past data exists, observed relationships between investment and outcomes. 2 The NAO figures have been deflated from £112.4 million for comparison with the 1999 budget, and include £9 million transition project costs that were part of the same budget (Property PPP & Windsor House refurbishments). Source: London Underground records as at April 2003 | |||||