Q11 Chairman: I said earlier that there were matters of general application. There are two thoughts that occur to me, Sir David. It seems incredible that the Home Office thought that it could go ahead without getting the confidence of local people, and this was a major stumbling block. Presumably, early on people thought: "Local people are bound to be against it; the district authority is going to say no; but we can overcome an appeal". However, nobody seemed to work out that all this would take much longer than you thought-first stumbling block. Second stumbling block: nobody seemed to keep in touch with evolving thought that undermined the whole process-evolving thought within your own department-that you were actually changing the way that you were processing applications. The people who were pushing ahead with this scheme, which ultimately cost us, the taxpayers, £30 million for nothing, because it never happened, took account neither of local opinion nor of evolving thought within their own department. That is fairly devastating, is it not?
Sir David Normington: It is undoubtedly the case that the planning application and the appeals against it took much longer than people thought, partly because of the determination of the local council and the local people, who took the appeal beyond the decision of the Secretary of State.
Q12 Chairman: Which was surely foreseeable?
Sir David Normington: Having looked at the papers, it was foreseen that this would probably go to the Secretary of State for decision after a planning inspector had looked at it, but I do not think it was estimated that there would be a further 15 months when it was appealed, first to the High Court and then to the Court of Appeal. Secondly, I accept, and I think that we have tried to learn this lesson since, that this was-and the report says it-a changing scene. A lot was happening. Other parts of the policy announced in 2002 were being quite successful and asylum applications were coming down very sharply. I guess that we will come to this, but in 2004 the whole case was looked at again and a decision was taken at that point nevertheless to proceed- even though it was two years on, and nearly three from-
Q13 Chairman: And also, if we look at paragraph 12, we find that your own Gateway 2 Review in July 2003 identified ways of reducing the need for accommodation centres. That was 11 months before the contract was signed. These ideas in your own Gateway 2 Review were ignored. There was not any kind of joined-up thought across your own department.
Sir David Normington: I believe that both of those reviews and the one in December 2003, which is the really serious one in my view, were taken very seriously. The one in December 2003 did lead to a complete reappraisal of the project.
Q14 Chairman: Eleven months later, after this Gateway Review in July 2003, the contract was signed. Basically, it was ignored, was it not?
Sir David Normington: It was not ignored, because I have looked at-
Q15 Chairman: The contract was still signed.
Sir David Normington: Indeed it was, but neither of the Gateway Reviews said that the contract should not be signed; what it said was: "You need to go back and look at the case again". Between the end of 2003 and the spring of 2004 that full reappraisal was done. A submission from that reappraisal went to the Accounting Officer and also to the Home Secretary, and both decided that we should go ahead and sign the contract.
Q16 Chairman: The problem was that there was a major review of policy going on, was there not? We see this in paragraph 3 and we see it in paragraph 29. That is quite clear. You accept that. This was evolving policy.
Sir David Normington: Policy was evolving over this period, yes.
Q17 Chairman: One has to ask was it wise, whilst policy was evolving, to trial this centre?
Sir David Normington: Of course, I have asked-we have both asked ourselves that question. From 2008 it is quite difficult to put ourselves in the place of the people who, in charge of all the facts, decided to go ahead with it in 2004. We probably ourselves would not take that decision with hindsight, but hindsight is a wonderful thing. I think that in May 2004 it was a critical decision. All the facts were laid out for both the senior management of the Home Office, the Accounting Officer and the Home Secretary, and they decided to go ahead.
Q18 Chairman: We know from Figure 11 that the total cost is £30 million-down the drain, basically, for nothing-with a staggering £7 million on consultancy fees. What do you say to that? For Bicester alone.
Sir David Normington: I think that it is more than seven, actually.
Q19 Chairman: Is it? I thought it said "Consultancy" at the top there. I do apologise. I am understating my case.
Sir David Normington: I should not be saying that either! I think that the costs of consultancy are very high. It is undoubtedly the case, though, that in a project like this you have to have professional advisers. There is no way the Home Office, or indeed any organisation, would have embarked on a project like this without professional advisers. That includes architects, cost consultants, people who advised on traffic and transport, land agents who looked for the sites, and so on. We could never employ those people. We would always have to employ professional advisers to do that, and that is where the costs came from. They do look high.
Q20 Chairman: By the way, lastly, you still do not know what you are going to do with the land, do you? We see that in paragraph 40. We have been talking about the past up to now. It says: "The Home Office is considering whether the land could be used as a detention centre"; so it is still sitting there, is it not? You still have not decided what to do with it.
Sir David Normington: It is still sitting there. We are still interested in it as a possible detention centre, but we have not taken that decision, no.