Q81 Mr Touhig: Why did the department commit itself to this project and sign the contract before the outcome of a judicial review was known? It signed the contract before you had detailed planning consent and it signed the contract despite the fact of having a "red" signal in the Gateway 3 Review.
Sir David Normington: Because, first of all, the case that was before those who took the decision pointed them to the view that it was still worth going ahead. Secondly, if the contract had not been signed in July, the cost of the whole project would increase. Thirdly, because they believed-rightly, as it turned out-that the appeals, which were appeals by the local council, would be turned down.
Q82 Mr Touhig: With all those warnings, Sir David, surely no one in their right mind would have signed this contract?
Sir David Normington: Well, they did.
Q83 Mr Touhig: They certainly did, yes. Not only was the accommodation centre a big financial risk, but clearly it was increasingly unnecessary by the time the Home Office signed the contract in the first place. Why did the department not respond to the reality that UK applications for asylum had halved?
Sir David Normington: They had halved but they were still very high. This was 750 places and it was thought that that was still necessary.
Q84 Mr Touhig: So no planning consent, a judicial review, a "red" warning, applications for asylum had halved, and still the department felt it should go ahead. It is like a tanker you cannot stop.
Sir David Normington: It was eventually stopped, of course. I have explained why, in good faith, those decisions were taken at the time. They were taken in good faith, on the evidence before people.
Q85 Mr Touhig: The contract was signed and, in September 2003, it was known that the previous year there had been a dramatic fall in the number of asylum seekers coming to the United Kingdom. Despite all these warnings, why did the department not reassess the need for this project? It is clearly something you just cannot stop.
Sir David Normington: It was not stopped, of course. If you look at the chart on page 9 you will see that, over the period from 1987, asylum claims are going up and down. I do not think they believed in 2004 that it was certain that asylum claims would continue to go down as they have. We can never be sure of that. Indeed, that period, 1999 to 2002, was very much in people's minds. It was only 18 months off. There was a fear that, if you did not do something like this and asylum claims went back up, people would say, "Why haven't you done something like this? Why haven't you got accommodation?".
Q86 Mr Touhig: There was a fear of criticism that nothing was being done; so it is belt and braces. "We're going to spend this money despite the fact we haven't got planning consent; despite the fact there is a judicial review; despite the fact that Gateway 3 had a 'red' light warning." It was going to go ahead because we had to be seen to be doing something. The fact that it has cost the taxpayer £28 million in waste and all we have is a field full of grass-that is immaterial, is it?
Sir David Normington: No, of course it is not immaterial. I have already admitted that that money has been spent and there is nothing to show for it except a derelict site. I just repeat: it is easy with hindsight to think that the decision was wrong. At the time, on the basis of the evidence they had in front of them, people, including my predecessor and the Home Secretary, believed it was right to go ahead.
Q87 Mr Touhig: Sir David, the most perfect view is the one looking back, and we are doing that now. It is "what if" and "if only"-I accept that-in all the things we do in life, and so on. However, your department had so many warnings not to proceed with this project, and yet it seems to me it was a project that the department just could not stop. They had to be seen to be doing something. I do not know how many you were planning. You did give us a figure earlier on. Was it 20 you were planning, or ten?
Sir David Normington: Ten.
Q88 Mr Touhig: It was ten you were planning across the country. It seems to me that it was something you just could not stop, despite the fact that this was running away with you.
Sir David Normington: It was thought that it was a necessary element of the policy. If you always take the view that you should not proceed with something-and this was quite a risky project, was it not? There is no doubt about it. Sometimes, though, if you do not try a different approach you never break out of the problems that Mr Mitchell was talking about.
Q89 Mr Touhig: We have managed without it. It does not exist but we have managed the asylum issue without it, have we not?
Sir David Normington: Yes, but we still have problems of settling asylum seekers in different parts of the country. There are many fewer and that is why the pressures are slightly less; but the problem is still there of where to accommodate asylum seekers.
Q90 Mr Touhig: One of the worrying things about the report, of course, is the fairly wide fluctuation of the department's cost estimates for this project, varying between £39 million and £51 million. You are not very good at estimating the cost of these projects, are you?
Sir David Normington: The costs went relentlessly up and you can see that. That, I think, was a function partly of the length of time it took but also that the specification changed. You can see at one point that a large centre for hearing appeals against decisions to remove was added to the project, and that added quite a lot of cost.