[Q81 to Q90]

Q81 Mr Bacon: Mr Rowlands, other external advisors, it says £26.5 million. Who are these other external advisors? What did they each get?
Mr Rowlands: We would have to give you a note on how it breaks down. As the Report says, in one place earlier on it covers Hornagold & Hills who were paid from memory, I think, £6 million out of that sum for project management. It covers KPMG and, as the Report says, it covers 25 other providers. I am afraid I do not have with me how that sum of20 odd million breaks across 27 different companies. We will have to let you have a note.7

Q82 Mr Bacon: I am looking at an article here from the Mail on Sunday from February last year in which it says that one of the consortia bidding for the taking of the London Tube is refusing to disclose how much it is paying to bankers and to legal advisers. A spokesman from Metronet confirmed the consortia would not be disclosing the full figures, and I quote: "It was very clear that we did not have to and we did not want to", he said. "Details have been passed to London Underground…" so to Mr O'Toole "…but we will not be making it public". Do you think that is an appropriate attitude with taxpayer's money?
Mr Rowlands: No.

Q83 Mr Bacon: You do not think it is appropriate?
Mr Rowlands: No, and I think the position will change statutorily from January of next year with the Freedom of Information Act coming into effect.

Q84 Mr Bacon: I am aware we got to this £455 million but still I would hope perhaps at some time we will get, before this inquiry is over, a much more thorough breakdown of what went where- £170 million of it is only some way down the line- and also some sub breakdown of how Freshfields managed to run up costs of£29 million, how the accountants managed to run up costs of£21 million, how Arthur Anderson-spelt with an "o" instead of an "e" I see-ran up a cost of£13 million and how PA ran up costs of£12 million. It would be interesting to see a breakdown of each of these.
Mr Rowlands: We will supply, if the NAO are happy, in conjunction with the NAO, so they are content with the figures, as detailed a breakdown as we are able to give you.8

Q85 Mr Bacon: If it is possible to have that before the next hearing that will be most helpful.
Mr Rowlands: We will do that.

Q86 Jon Cruddas: Can I start from a slightly different tack, Mr O'Toole. Many of the improvements including line upgrades, which the Chairman touched on, to increase the capacity of the network are not intended to be delivered until after the seven and a half year contract but, according to the Mayor's own spatial economic development plan, London is growing quite extraordinarily over the next ten to 15 years, possibly up to 800,000 new people living in the city, possibly 5-600,000 extra jobs. Are you concerned about the lack of constraint in capacity versus the huge growth in prospective usership?
Mr O'Toole: I am concerned about it. I think it points up why it is so critical that financial commitment has to be followed through into that second period. Some of the time we have to wait but we have to be sure that it is not delayed and you know these public spend projects -worldwide I am speaking-do not have a great record in terms of being turned in on time and on budget. It is absolutely critical that we have the information, that we are able to chart this and drive it so that it comes in on time. I would say further, however, and I do not mean to cause an unnecessary digression but this is why we have to have CrossRail.

Q87 Jon Cruddas: Sure. There are other issues in terms of total infrastructure. Do you model prospective usage of the Tube versus the capacity of the network, notwithstanding the CrossRail issue, over the next seven and a half years?
Mr O'Toole: We do model it. We are seeing the ridership on the Tube at the moment fairly flat but as there is further development to the east there are going to be more and more demands placed on especially those arteries going out to the east which is why it is so critical, for example, that the Jubilee Line upgrade comes in on time because our capacity will go up between 40% and 50% when that new signal system is put in place.

Q88 Jon Cruddas: Mr Rowlands, it says in paragraph 2.10 of Report one that by October 1999 bidder interest in the PPP was fading. What was your Department's contingency plan if the PPP had not been agreed?
Mr Rowlands: The Department's position-as set out in the Committee stage I think when the Greater London Act was going through-was that the Underground would be transferred to TfL once the PPP had been completed. Formally I think it is fair to say that there was no plan B if PPP had never been completed, although if you want me to speculate-

Q89 Jon Cruddas: You had contingency plans?
Mr Rowlands: -plan B, if PPP could not have been completed, would have been to pass the Underground to TfL, to the Mayor. I think that was effectively plan B.

Q90 Jon Cruddas: Your earlier argument was that the political dynamics which shadowed a lot of this created a lot of risk and upset some of the discussions and made them more protracted in terms of deliberations?
Mr Rowlands: Certainly it was the case that in carrying the PPP through it was probably worth, as the Report acknowledges, bearing in mind that it was subject to two judicial reviews mounted by the Mayor.




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7  Ev 25, 35

8 Ev 25, 35