2.18 In October 2000, the Department's guidance on funding operational planning for PFI schemes was that the then London Regional Office would re-imburse the scheme with 1. 75 per cent of the capital costs to fund the cost of developing the scheme to Full Business Case. The scheme, with projected capital costs in the 2000 OBC of £360 million was therefore based on a funding ceiling of £6.3 million. The project team understood that this could not vary, despite the significant increase in the estimated capital cost of the scheme.
2.19 The abolition of NHS Regional Offices in March 2002 transferred the responsibility for funding project costs to the local NHS. The North West London Strategic Health Authority provided £2 million for project costs in 2002/03 and £1.5 million in 2003/04. However from April 2004 the eight main commissioning Primary Care Trusts only agreed to cover half the sum sought from them. PUK agreed to match this funding.
2.20 The Royal Brompton and Harefield NHS Trust had activity commissioned by all 303 Primary Care Trusts over the period the scheme was being developed. Since most PCTs therefore had little activity carried out by the Royal Brompton and Harefield NHS Trust, it had correspondingly little influence over their commissioning decisions. In addition, approximately 20 per cent of the Royal Brompton and Harefield NHS Trust's income came from specialist clinical service commissioners and research and development funding, neither of which considered that their resources had been increased to enable them to support project development costs. As noted by the Independent Review Panel, inadequate and inappropriate funding handicapped the scheme's management capability throughout the planning phase.
2.21 Had the revised OBC been approved in 2004 or 2005 for a higher capital value the funds available would have increased to approximately £16.6 million. The Department told us it believed the Trusts were in a position to redirect operational costs to provide funds, if they so chose.
2.22 The Independent Review Panel concluded that there had been a number of significant lapses in basic programme management disciplines, only partially accounted for by inadequate resourcing of the scheme. These contributed to the failure of the Campus scheme. They included inadequate management of stakeholders, risks, work briefs and general progress (Appendix 2). When it first became involved, PUK discussed with the Campus partners the need for project resources to be increased and management processes strengthened.
2.23 From approval of the OBC in October 2000, the planned date of advertising the scheme in the Official Journal of the European Union (OJEU) slipped five times, from summer 2001 to July 2003. In the event, no OJEU notice was ever issued. Such delays would have dented market confidence in the scheme and the project team.
2.24 The Project Director's contract was terminated in October 2002, by mutual agreement, reflecting the Projec Board's dissatisfaction with the slow progress in meeting development planning milestones. An interim Project Director was appointed in October and a permanent replacement from April 2003.