The NAO Report draws three key conclusions:
1. The MoD did not receive an equitable share of the proceeds of privatisation, because Qinetiq was undervalued when part of it was sold to the Carlyle Group in 2003 [4.12] and because of the generous share incentive scheme adopted for the senior management of Qinetiq which "exceeded what was necessary" [Summary 9],
2. The huge £5.6B Long Term Partnering Agreement (LTPA) between the MoD and Qinetiq, by which Qinetiq was without competition given a contract to provide test and evaluation services to MoD for the next 25 years, incorporates major price risks to MoD [4.23],
3. The Chief Executive of Qinetiq proposed to the Carlyle Group, before it was chosen as the preferred bidder, an incentive scheme for senior management and the allocation of shares to senior managers (including some to himself) without involvement of the remuneration committee established by the MoD [2.15-2.17].