Flexibility for local police forces was built into the structure of the deal

1.12 PITO divided Airwave into three parts:

  The Core Service - This service would be provided exclusively by the contractor with universal features across Great Britain set at a level just below that required to meet all operational requirements (see Figure 2 overleaf). The contract for the Core Service would be between PITO and the contractor, with PITO paying the contractor directly for the service. The Core Service would provide:

  interoperability between police forces;

  economies of scale;

  support for national police users such as the National Crime Squad and potential sharers; and

 subject  to availability and performance, an assured revenue stream for the contractor.

  Menu Exclusive Services - These services would be provided exclusively by the contractor from a call-off menu of additional services that augment the functionality of Airwave above the Core Service. Each police force would identify its local needs, for instance where it required enhanced coverage that allowed the use of handheld radios in an urban area or more capacity for simultaneous transmissions (see Figure 2). Each police force, through its police authority, would enter a tripartite agreement with PITO and the contractor for the provision of Menu Exclusive Services. Under these agreements, police forces would purchase their required additional services directly from the contractor. The price for each Menu Exclusive Service would be set nationally.

  Menu Competitive Services - These services would be for the supply and maintenance of terminals (vehicle-mounted radios, handheld radios and mobile data terminals) and control room equipment. Forces would conduct their own competitions for the supply of these services. 

Splitting the service in this way was expected to reduce some risks associated with the project. Payment by each police force for its Menu Exclusive Services should bring local value for money disciplines to bear in determining local needs. The Menu Competitive Services would avoid locking police forces into a contract with a single supplier for equipment for which there would be an established market in which prices were likely to fall over the replacement cycle. However, this division also created risks that fault allocation and responsibility for rectification would be obscured by contractual interfaces. O2 has told us that this risk has materialised and has, so far, not been easily resolved.