2.18 PITO saw benefits from using a should-cost model. It realised that compiling information about the costs of Airwave would permit direct comparisons with, and challenges to, O2's estimated costs. PITO consulted its advisers about using such a model as a pivotal element in its value for money assessment. The advisers
|
10 |
|
Options reviewed by PITO after competitive tension had been lost |
|
Option |
Reasons given by PITO to reject options |
|
1 Continue with O2 |
|
|
2 Re-run single procurement of a national system |
|
|
3 Implement fallback |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
4 Do-nothing |
|
|
|
|
|
5 Adapt procurement strategy to engender competition (e.g. a series of regional procurements) |
|
|
Source: PITO |
|
supported the concept, but with the proviso that O2 should supply detailed information quantifying the assets and labour needed to deliver Airwave. PITO, with support from Home Office experts and Mason Communications, considered that it possessed the ability to analyse the reasonableness of quantity related information.
2.19 Mason Communications also informed PITO that there was sufficient cost information in the public domain to allow independent pricing of components. The project team considered that this cost information, together with information quantifying components and a construction programme, could be used to test the reasonableness of O2's bid. PITO also considered that the model would be an ideal tool to use in benchmarking exercises during the term of the contract.