13 Following the signing of the contract in 1998, the Department retained a team to manage its residual responsibilities at the NPL. As a result, when Laser and JLC Ltd found that they were in trouble, the Department already had in place a project team that included staff and advisers with experience of the project. As the problems increased, the Department engaged additional technical and legal advisers to support and direct the team.
14 JLC Ltd's approach to the project became more adversarial as its problems mounted. The Department strove to avoid compromising its contractual position. It was prepared to accept lower performance requirements providing the relaxations did not compromise scientific research. Prudently in the circumstances, the Department refrained from requesting changes to the specification, and so avoided obscuring Laser's design responsibilities. Despite being of the view that some construction phases had been wrongly certified as complete, the Department paid the required unitary charge in full, adhering to legal advice that it was under an obligation to do so, pending overturning of the Independent Certifier's completion certificates by adjudication. Also, the Department's ability to sustain leading scientific research in the pre-contract, existing laboratories effectively avoided supply side pressures in the provision of laboratory space.
15 At least three times from 2001 onwards, the Department considered terminating the contract on the basis of default by Laser. However, each time, the Department was advised that there was a risk that to do so would expose it to a claim for damages. The Department was also concerned that it might not be able to find another contractor to take on the project.