22. Unlike any other radio system or mobile phone system, Airwave will provide guaranteed access and coverage. Under the contract 02 agreed to conduct a pilot project in Lancashire. PITO's acceptance of the pilot was a condition precedent to the start of the roll-out of the service. The two most critical problems encountered during the pilot were the difficulty of demonstrating that coverage met requirements in all the key areas, particularly major roads, and the persistent dropping of users from the system. Attempts to resolve these problems led to an extension of the pilot period, but they were still not fully resolved before PITO accepted Airwave, albeit on a conditional basis. 02 explained that the purpose of the pilot had been to examine in great detail all the issues associated with the implementation of Airwave so that lessons could be learned. A number of problems had been encountered and these had now been resolved to the extent that the service was now operating in five police forces. Some issues were still outstanding on the implementation of the new system for the Greater Manchester Police and 02 had not yet shown that Airwave could work as expected in major metropolitan areas, something that had to be done over the next two years.20
23. O2 had invested very heavily in the technology and PITO believed that Airwave would provide an exceptional service. If Airwave failed or could not produce a good enough service, PITO would endeavour to ensure that 02 delivered its obligations under the contract. The police had not given away the right to use someone else. But as most of the old analogue radio systems would have been replaced by Airwave, it would be difficult to return to an analogue system and PITO would have to procure an alternative system, probably on a local basis. The Home Office told us that 02 would be required to deliver under the contract and if it did not deliver, there would be severe consequences. There was, however, a residual risk that a new supplier might have to be found because police operations depended on effective radio communications.21
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20 C&AG's Report, paras 3.3, 3.7-3.18; Qq 15-16, 111