6. The Intent of Congress and Chevron USA, Inc. v. the National Resources Defense Council

Comment: The majority of respondents claimed that including quenching and tempering in the definition of "produce" for steel armor plate is against the intent of Congress. One respondent cited Chevron USA, Inc. v. the National Resources Defense Council (Chevron USA, Inc.) that concluded that agency regulations such as the DFARS should be subject to a two-part test that first considers the intent of Congress.

DoD Response: Chevron USA, Inc. applies only if the intent of Congress is not clear. DoD looks primarily to the language of the statutes enacted by Congress to determine the requirements of the law. Here, the statute does not define the term "produce." As the court in Chevron USA, Inc. stated, "if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue," the question for the court is "whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute." Committee reports and letters from individual or groups of representatives or senators are not law and, in any event, do not necessarily reflect the intent of the majority of Congress. Moreover, although the House of Representatives' version of the specialty metals provision could have been interpreted as specifically excluding quenching and tempering from the definition of "produce," this version of the bill was not enacted. Finally, although section 823 requested a review of the definition by DoD, it did not direct a particular outcome of that review.