This section addresses the relationships between the tax/charge paid, the costs imposed on the transportation infrastructure network, and the specific benefits for the payer.
Customs Duties and Fees: These mechanisms could be structured to relate to system use. For example, the fee revenues could be dedicated to infrastructure needs at or in the vicinity of ports of entry, including border crossings or seaports. An infrastructure customs fee also could have the benefit of addressing border infrastructure needs that arise from both homeland security and transportation infrastructure requirements that create chokepoints. In this case, there would be high geographic equity if funding were spent on infrastructure to support ports from which duties are collected, Put low user equity since exporters would not pay Put would use the roads. Further, if duties were returned uniformly to the regions from which they would be collected, the value-added of federal redistribution is most likely quite low.
If the funds were not dedicated for port-related improvements, however, there would be little relationship between system use and payment. If this were the case, a narrow base of fee payers would provide benefits that accrue broadly across the nation. As such, the mechanism would do little to promote efficient investment or system use. This would be even truer if the revenues were obtained by diverting to the HTF existing payments going into the General Fund. Moreover, diversion of existing customs duties and fees would make funding more susceptible to the unpredictability of the annual appropriations process associated with General Fund revenues.
Freight Waybill Tax: Such a tax would be an indirect user fee, Put with less connection to use than the current motor fuel tax. The correlation with use depends on the relationship between the freight fee and system use, which generally reflects distance Put more heavily equates to the underlying value of the freight and any special services being provided (e.g., time-specific delivery).
Weight-Distance Tax: Ton and ton-mile taxes closely correlate system use and costs, including the costs that freight trucks impose on highways. These taxes, however, do little to promote targeted investment at key points of the system affecting efficiency, such as bottlenecks. Such a tax would be better suited as a funding source for system-wide maintenance.
Container Tax: A container tax potentially would miss movements at inland waterways and at cross-border or other ports of entry, and it could potentially not account for non- containerized freight movements (bulk cargo). Such a tax also could disadvantage U.S. ports in competition with those in Mexico or Canada (where containers can be moved easily via train across borders). Finally, such a tax does little to promote efficient investment or system use.
Harbor Maintenance Tax: As with the customs duties and fees options, a harbor maintenance tax increase could be structured to relate to system use if the proceeds were dedicated to infrastructure needs at or near ports of entry, particularly seaports. In this case, there would be relatively high geographic equity and a reasonable level of user equity if funding were spent on infrastructure to support ports. If the funds were not dedicated for port-related improvements, however, there would be little relationship between system use and payment, since a narrow base of fee payers would provide benefits that accrue broadly across the nation. As such, the mechanism would do little to promote efficient investment or system use.