Another aspect of an opt out program would be its tendency to lead to "devolution" of the federal program. Those states at the top of the federal HTF "donor" list (i.e., with the smallest return ratios of distributions from the federal HTF to attributed payments into the federal HTF) would be the most likely to consider opting out. Assuming that opt out rebates were tied to estimated payments into the HTF (consistent with such proposals), then each donor state would find it advantageous, strictly in terms of net proceeds, to opt out of the federal program (where its return is less than 100¢ on the dollar) and increase its own taxes (where its return would by definition equal 100¢ on the dollar). While this might sound like a fair and rational decision for each donor state to make, it would have significant impacts on the remaining states-essentially forcing them out of their donee status and causing a major reallocation of what essentially would be diminished federal resources. The Commission appreciates the desire of donor states to change their status with respect to the current allocation of HTF resources at the federal level. But without first ascertaining the appropriate federal role and identifying sufficient revenues at all levels of government and from all feasible sources to fund the required investments, trying to implement a voluntary opt out program would be counterproductive to supporting a viable national network.