Q51 Mr Bacon: Rather than with the Department of State concerned, ultimately.
Sharon White: Yes. Ultimately, the Treasury, with the MPA's advice and expertise.
Q52 Chair: Is that going to happen, Sharon, or is this just what you would like?
Sharon White: I think that is where we need to be moving to, and there are examples already.
Q53 Mr Bacon: So you would be able to turn round to a Permanent Secretary, a Secretary of State or a Department of State, and say, "You've been trying too long, for any good you've been doing here. Stop." You cut off the money. Yes?
Sharon White: Yes.
Q54 Mr Bacon: And has that happened yet from the centre?
David Pitchford: Pretty much.
Sharon White: There are examples of stoppage and very many examples, even in the past few months, of re-scoping.
Q55 Chair: Very many examples?
Sharon White: Yes, of re-scoping.
Q56 Chair: We can think of two.
David Pitchford: The National Programme for IT at the Department of Health is an example, in effect, of this reset button. We recommended-
Q57 Chair: Which programme?
David Pitchford: NPflT.
Q58 Chair: We know about that and we know about the carbon capture. Those are the two we know about.
David Pitchford: The third one is e-Borders, where the recommendations were to terminate contracts. In relation to NPflT, we made recommendations to Ministers and the Secretary of State that the project should be halted and dismantled, and those recommendations were adopted. To a certain extent, we do have the capability, but there needs to be a certain arrangement; the events need to fall in a certain direction. We do not have the power to go out and require wholesale change in the way that you are suggesting, but we do have the power when, for example, a project has been running at the red end of life for four or five years.
Q59 Mr Bacon: In other words, if the car crash is big enough, you can get it stopped. I spent years trying to find a red button to press. I spent quite a long time briefing your Department when they had a Prime Minister's question. I spent ages briefing Downing Street and indeed the Cabinet Office to try to make sure that in whatever answer was given, it completely ignored the Department of Health. I am delighted to say they did. The president of the corporation was giving an analysts conference to some stockbrokers in New York when the Prime Minister happened to be on his feet-I did not plan this; I did not know this bit-and within two minutes one of the analysts said, "Do you know the British Prime Minister has just said you are not going to get any more contracts?" But it should not have been down to me. There should have been something inside that should have made it happen earlier.
Q60 Meg Hillier: That brings me to a point that might put the answer in context. If a Department, whether it is a Permanent Secretary or a Minister, calls upon you to look at a project, do you say no if it is not on your risk list, or do you go in and do it? I can see that there would be many motives for doing that- good and perhaps not so good-but if I were a Minister and I had a problem, I would welcome your input, but it may be that it just would not hit the radar for you. In that context, can you answer that as well?
David Pitchford: I can answer that from a couple of different perspectives. Yes, we have had commissions from particular Ministers about particular concerns. Indeed, the National Programme for IT was a commission from the Prime Minister himself. We have also been asked by Ministers to look into projects that had the appearance of being troubled. We also have, increasingly, Permanent Secretaries from Departments asking us to come and have a look and see what we think should be done about their projects. Of course, then there is the process of the GMPP ones as well.