The exaggeration and overpricing of risk transfer is likely to be the main source of profiteering given its role in PPP business cases. The extent to which particular projects achieved construction cost and completion targets is not available so it is not possible to determine the extent to which this was a factor.
A review of construction risk and 14 studies of traditional and PPP construction in Britain, France, Norway and Australia concluded "…there's a strong argument to suggest that lenders to well-structured PPP projects with fixed-price contracts (and adequate risk mitigation) and strong, experienced contractors in jurisdictions familiar with PPPs - and the principles of project financing - remain insulated from any material construction cost overrun risk at all" (Bain, 2010). He notes that construction cost overruns were considerably reduced when measured from the stage of budget approval than the earlier stage of original project approval. Furthermore, a review of 66 PPP projects for a major European Bank in 2009 found that 85% were delivered within or under budget (ibid).
In addition, the secondary market may have had a role in increasing the value of PPP assets and thus the price at which equity was sold, particularly infrastructure funds building portfolios of PPP assets.