Case studies

Our 2015 report on the GP Extraction Service found that project requirements were not initially set out in detail. When the NHS Information Centre (now NHS Digital) then needed to work with the client to produce detailed requirements, it had issues with high project manager turnover, reliance on contractors for expertise and not having sufficient capability for requirement workshops. It found it difficult to agree detailed requirements.

Our 2016 report on contracted-out health and disability assessments found that the Department for Work & Pensions continued to set high targets and use assumptions without evidence or sufficient testing and challenge. It also allowed bidders to make assumptions about staff training that it knew were overly optimistic and difficult to achieve.

The Department for Transport shared with us its approach to developing a benchmark to assess bids. It iteratively develops models for expected bids each time it runs a rail franchise competition. Models consider, alongside other assumptions, previous growth rates, adjustments for planned changes (eg electrification of particular routes), the context of bids on other franchises and a prediction of the likely offers from bidders. These are used to predict revenue costs and likely profit demands. This means that the Department can take a more intelligent view of bids and focus on the areas that fall outside its predictions and expectations, which will be more risky.

In our 2016 investigation into UK Trade & Investment's specialist services contract we found that UKTI gave insufficient challenge to its supplier's costings, bids and negotiations. For example, it did not challenge when elements of the price that had previously been described as 'fixed' were changed, or when a new element was introduced to the pricing mechanism.

UnitingCare Partnership (2016 report) won a five-year contract to provide older people's and adult community services from the Cambridgeshire and Peterborough clinical commissioning group. The partnership made a tactical decision to submit a lower bid to win the tender, despite increasing demand for services. This lower bid helped win the contract, but neither organisation could fully assess whether the contract price was viable due to limitations in the data. This contributed to the collapse of the contract.

In our 2015 Superfast (Rural) Broadband Programme update we found that during the first phase of the programme, the Department for Culture, Media & Sport developed its knowledge of costs and undertook cost comparison exercises. It used this understanding to agree lower costs with its supplier in the next phase of the programme.