Sub-questions

Is there evidence that different ways of delivering the programme have been evaluated?

Has the programme been appropriately tendered and contractors/partners selected using a defensible process?

Is there appropriate sharing of risk and reward between parties?

Are risks owned by the parties best placed to manage them?

See the in-depth tools on Delivery for tools containing more detailed questions on specific delivery strategies. For instance, Commercial and contract management: insights and emerging best practice covers issues with risk transfer.

Essential evidence

The delivery strategy, including a procurement strategy if appropriate.

Delivery strategy - examples from our studies

Our 2018 landscape review of the Defence Nuclear Enterprise reported that the Ministry of Defence (MoD) used four main contractors for 97%, by value, of its Enterprise-related contracts. These contractors in turn used around 1,500 sub-contractors, many of which were small and specialist. The MoD recognised that the commercial arrangements did not provide incentives for contractors to perform as needed, so it introduced new ways of working with them to try to address historic poor performance. The most significant change affected the production of the Dreadnought-class submarine. From 1 April 2018, two of the main contractors and a new organisation within the MoD, the Submarine Delivery Agency, reached an overarching commercial agreement with coordinated incentives that involved joint costs and schedules and a profit-based incentive scheme. The MoD hoped this would improve performance in delivering the Enterprise through a combination of better project controls, stronger collaboration and information sharing, and more rigorous oversight.

In E20: renewing the EastEnders set (see Q10) we found that by the time of our 2018 report, the BBC expected the E20 programme to be completed in May 2023 - 31 months later than envisaged in its 2015 plans. E20 was delayed by around 12 months as a result of commercial challenges. In 2017, the BBC revised its procurement approach for the Front Lot construction contract owing to a lack of market interest. This delayed the programme by around six months and increased costs by an estimated £2.3 million. The BBC avoided further delays by separating the enabling works from this contract and carrying them out within its existing Boiler House contract. The BBC, acknowledging that its original single-stage approach had not worked, moved to a two-stage procurement with contractors on its construction framework in early 2017. An initial stage appointment was made in April 2017. The second stage involved seeking more clarity about the BBC's requirements and design before proposing costs for various elements of the work. There were around 11 months of negotiations - six months more than planned - as contract price offers were higher than anticipated, and the BBC and its contractors needed to agree the type and supply of bricks, allocate risks and confirm provisional sums.

Other relevant reports

Hinkley Point C (paragraph 8)

Transforming Rehabilitation (paragraphs 12 to 14)

The new generation electronic monitoring programme (paragraph 12)

Update on the Thameslink Programme (paragraph 12)

The Nuclear Decommissioning Authority's Magnox contract (paragraphs 2 to 4 and 10 to 13)

Rolling out smart meters (paragraph 11)