Sub-questions

Have stakeholders endorsed the requirements for absorbing the programme's aims into ongoing operations?

Is the organisational structure appropriate for the new operational context?

Are revised operational procedures appropriate and in place?

Has responsibility for benefit realisation been allocated to operational business units?

Does the completed programme satisfy the organisation and key stakeholder requirements?

Has sufficient and relevant learning, guidance and experience been migrated from the programme team to the operations team?

Essential evidence

Plan for implementing programme.

Transition to business as usual - examples from our studies

Our 2019 Progress review of Transforming Rehabilitation reported that the reforms to probation services had failed to meet the Ministry of Justice (MoJ)'s targets to reduce reoffending, or its wider objectives. It cancelled its contracts with probation providers early at an additional cost to the taxpayer. We found that the MoJ had designed and implemented reforms to rehabilitation services too quickly, without sufficient testing. It split probation services into 21 new Community Rehabilitation Companies (CRCs) and a National Probation Service, which then created interfaces it had to manage. The MoJ had acted on many of the shortcomings in the reforms, but would still need to manage the risks posed by the split between the CRCs and National Probation Service and with the wider system. It would also need to manage the risks of transitioning to the new contracts, and of existing providers withdrawing services or failing outright.

In our 2017 Update on the Thameslink Programme (see Q14) we concluded that the upgrade to the Thameslink routes through London had a realistic prospect of delivering value for money, but there remained risks which the Department for Transport (DfT) and Network Rail needed to manage carefully, having not begun this work early enough. DfT deferred the full introduction of the new services by up to a year in order to improve its ability to manage the risks of each service change. The wider rail network could not yet reliably support the Thameslink programme's new services. DfT and Network Rail did not initially make adequate arrangements to manage the introduction of the new services, which required a high degree of collaboration across the rail industry, and clarity over who had the authority to make decisions on how the rail network operated. However, making the decision to defer full service introduction at a late stage compressed the schedule to prepare for the May 2018 train timetable, contributing to significant disruption to services in the south east of England.

Other relevant reports

Crown Commercial Service (paragraph 9)

Developing new care models through NHS vanguards (paragraphs 10 and 20)

Rolling out Universal Credit (paragraph 14)

Projects leaving the Government Major Projects Portfolio (paragraph 11)

Investigation into the British Army's Recruiting Partnering Project (paragraphs 8 and 9)