3 We interviewed relevant individuals from the NDA, including the current chair and chief executive officer (CEO), and the chair and CEO who were in post throughout most of the events in our report. We also interviewed NDA executive directors involved in the contract.
4 We also interviewed relevant individuals from the Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy (the Department), HM Treasury, UK Government Investments (UKGI) and the Infrastructure and Projects Authority (IPA).
5 We reviewed relevant documents, including:
• minutes and papers from NDA Board meetings, minutes of the Competition Programme Board and minutes of the Change Control Board;
• papers from the monthly and quarterly governance meetings between the NDA, UKGI, the Department and HM Treasury;
• ministerial submissions by UKGI and HM Treasury;
• minutes of the cross-government meetings on Magnox chaired by the chief executive of the civil service;
• the NDA's business cases for the competition, and supporting documents including the competition procurement strategy, contracting strategy, tender evaluation report and risk registers;
• assurance reviews conducted by the Office for Government Commerce (later the Infrastructure and Projects Authority), NDA internal audit and the NDA's external assurance partners;
• letters of comfort submitted by the NDA's legal advisers, Burges Salmon;
• correspondence between the NDA and bidders; and
• the courts' judgments on the Energy Solutions case.
6 We reviewed cost data provided to us by the NDA. We have not audited these figures.