Performance baseline

3.30  The Department expects to reduce the cost of flying training by decreasing the number of:

•  training aircraft;

•  live flying hours; and

•  instructors.

3.31  In its business case for the fixed-wing training contract, the Department set baseline figures and expected performance figures in each of these areas (Figure 20 overleaf). The Department could not provide complete data for us to test its assumptions around expected changes in performance. For example, Ascent plans to reduce costs by decreasing the number of training aircraft. Availability should increase with more modern aircraft. However, fewer aircraft mean less capacity to absorb lower than planned availability or loss of aircraft to damage. Ascent carries the financial impact of this risk but the Department carries any risk associated with the impact it has on Ascent's ability to train aircrew. The Department has raised concerns about the number of basic flying training aircraft Ascent plans to provide. But we have seen no analysis by Ascent or the Department exploring the potential impact on training output of lower than planned aircraft availability or aircraft loss.

3.32  The Department has also developed a 'best-case' comparison for the cost of core training for a fast-jet pilot (Figure 21 on page 51). It compares the assumed lowest cost of current training against the planned cost of new core training. The analysis indicates that the cost of training a fast-jet pilot will be reduced by £0.75 million. Our review of the Department's calculations indicates that both the current and forecast cost figures include inaccuracies that may affect their validity.

3.33  Most training costs occur at operational training units when training aircrew on front-line aircraft types rather than in core training. The cost of operational training is unknown. However, an Army estimate in 2011 suggests that £3.2 million of the estimated £3.6 million it costs to train an Apache attack helicopter pilot are outside of core training. Therefore, the greatest potential cost savings are likely to be after this phase of training and fall under a different area of responsibility.

3.34  Extra activity within core training will incur costs, even if it reduces costs overall. If training transfers from expensive front-line aircraft to less expensive aircraft in core training, the Department must either:

•  reallocate funding from operational training (for example, by renegotiating support contracts to recognise reduced flying hours) into core training to fund the extra activity; or

•  provide extra funding for core training and use the flying hours in the operational training for more advanced training.

3.35  The Department has so far been unable to identify specific cost savings in operational training. It cannot get significant financial benefits until it does this, and decides how to reallocate funding or use extra flying hours.

3.36  For example, the Typhoon operational training unit has altered its training programme to reflect the new approach to core training for advanced fast-jet pilots. It now flies fewer training flights to achieve the same pilot quality. This has helped to reduce training time from 24 to 18 weeks, which has made aircraft available for more front-line duties. However, the Department has not measured this increased availability and the front line has not quantified the benefit.