7 Poor governance arrangements had allowed different expectations of the GoCo proposition to develop within the Department. Unusually, the key oversight board for the Materiel Strategy was also chaired by the senior responsible owner for the Materiel Strategy and reported directly to the Defence board, rather than through the Department's accounting officer.42 This complicated how head office oversaw the Materiel Strategy.
8 Some key decisions were not clearly documented or evidenced while developing the Materiel Strategy. Although the acquisition architecture board met fortnightly from March 2013, no minutes were taken until after the GoCo competition was stopped.
9 The lack of clear formal evidence hinders effective scrutiny of the process followed. However, because of the different expectations that had emerged around what was being asked of industry and in the GoCo's purpose, the Department had to change the proposition significantly three weeks before being issued to the market. This prioritised greater cost savings, rather than focusing on improving DE&S's performance.
10 The Department chose to pursue the most challenging timetable that was potentially achievable, which broadly equated to a 10% confidence of achieving, although it recognised this timetable was likely to slip. The late changes to the GoCo proposition made achieving this timetable even less likely. Although the Department's internal scrutiny team raised serious concerns about the proposition, it was still issued to the market, rather than delaying the timetable.
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42 Acquisition architecture board.