3.8.1 In conclusion, the City of Edinburgh Council were faced with a totally unexpected problem, which they have managed extremely well despite the very significant challenges which they had to address. For this they are to be complimented. The problems they have had to face were fundamentally the result of poor quality construction and poor quality supervision of construction, which in slightly different circumstances, could have resulted in the injury or loss of the lives of school children.
3.8.2 This Edinburgh Schools problem has a greater significance than it otherwise might have had, due to the fact that the same set of fundamental defects, impacting on the structural integrity of the external walls of the schools, were found across 17 schools built by a range of different main contractors, bricklaying subcontractors, and bricklaying squads. This was not the result of the isolated incompetence of a rogue sub-contractor or bricklaying squad.
3.8.3 Similar defects have been identified across other school buildings in Scotland. Some of these, predating the collapse in Edinburgh, also resulted in the collapse of brickwork panels. Again, fortuitously, these did not cause injury to school children.
3.8.4 Following the Report of the extent of defective construction found at the Edinburgh Schools, the Scottish Government requested all local authorities in Scotland to undertake a review of their school buildings. This sensible step resulted in the identification of the need for remedial work to a number of schools.
3.8.5 It would, however, be naive to suggest that this is a problem only relating to the construction of schools and that contractors apply a better standard of quality assurance on other building types. If these defects are present in school buildings, there is also a likelihood that they are present with similar frequency in other buildings that contain large masonry panels or where masonry panels are required to be tied back to a structural frame.
3.8.6 What is also significant about the Edinburgh situation is that highly professional and competent teams of structural engineers were unable to identify, through detailed visual inspections, the existence of serious defects in the construction of the walls they examined. This point is worthy of wider consideration by those who may have relied on visual inspections as a form of assurance that the underlying construction of walls are sound. Any such inadequacies in the construction of masonry panels, must therefore, be detected prior to walls being closed-up or there is no easy practical way of ensuring they have been built properly. This requires effective quality assurance and scrutiny during construction.
3.8.7 It is incumbent upon the construction industry to develop and promulgate best practice methods that can be relied upon to provide the necessary level of assurance in relation to those areas of construction that become quickly closed-up to inspection, the failure of which could impact on the safety of the users of buildings. In addition to the construction of masonry panels, fire-stopping has been identified in the Report as another such area deserving of special attention.
3.8.8 It is also clear that clients, particularly public sector clients with statutory duties in relation to the communities they serve, cannot simply delegate away from themselves the responsibility of putting in place an appropriate level of informed, independent scrutiny to ensure the safety of the public buildings they procure. By independent scrutiny the Inquiry is referring to inspection by individuals or organisations appointed by or directly employed by the client who are independent of the project company or contractor undertaking the project.
3.8.9 The exact nature and effectiveness of the role of Building Standards in this regard is also worthy of further review and consideration. The potential extension of the current requirement for formal certification of parts of the work by qualified individuals, as is the case for electrical and plumbing installations, may offer a possible solution to the lack of inspections that Building Standards can practically carry out in relation to elements of the structure or fabric of buildings that could cause injury if not constructed properly.
3.8.10 Despite the significant increasing reliance being placed on the quality assurance by contractors of their own work, there is no formal requirement for the personnel within contracting organisations charged with undertaking this role to have undergone any recognised test of competency to do so.
3.8.11 It is the view of the Inquiry that the problem associated with the PPP1 schools has raised issues that are of considerable significance in relation to ensuring that the quality and safety of buildings produced by the construction industry in Scotland (and potentially the rest of the UK) are delivered to the required standards.
3.8.12 The construction industry is a part of our economy that suffers greatly from the boom and bust syndrome, resulting in difficulty in maintaining the availability of highly skilled tradesmen because of the lack of a guaranteed continuity of work. The traditional and hugely valuable concept of building contractors employing and training tradesmen such as bricklayers and joiners through apprenticeships within their own workforce has also largely disappeared. Additionally, the image of the construction industry is one that currently does not appear to be attractive to young people.
3.8.13 The quality of a building is ultimately dependent on the quality of the individual tradesmen who build it. Across all of the witnesses who expressed an opinion on this issue to the Inquiry, there was a common concern that this is a growing problem which the construction industry must address.
3.8.14 The level of inspection required in any manufacturing pursuit should be designed to reflect the risk or the level of occurrence of defective work. To those with experience of the building industry, and as evidenced in these projects and many more, that risk unfortunately remains real and until evidence demonstrates otherwise, appropriate independent inspection will be a sensible provision by clients.
3.8.15 Recent changes to models of procurement of public building, driven by a desire for greater efficiency, and an unachievable desire to transfer all risk away from the client, have unfortunately not appreciated the need to build into these models the essential provision of an appropriate level of independent scrutiny.
3.8.16 Frequently clients under such arrangements have limited direct access to the architects and engineers who design their projects or to any reports they may produce other than through the contractor. Not only does this inevitably impact on the overall design quality achieved, but with these changes the presence of architects and engineers on site has reduced. Increasingly, Clerks of Works and resident engineers are also not being employed to assist in the protection of the quality of construction.
3.8.17 A number of witnesses to the Inquiry identified a desire to reduce the cost of fees as a major factor in deciding the level of provision of effective inspection of construction, rather than a serious assessment of the risks of not providing for adequate independent scrutiny.
3.8.18 A review of the drivers that have resulted in the virtual removal of appropriate independent scrutiny is required to bring the pendulum back to a more realistic position in this regard. As stated before, best practice methods are available, and could be incorporated into all models of procurement to address what is clearly emerging as a shortcoming in the way the construction industry currently operates. The procurers of buildings need to consider whether the drive for faster, lower cost construction may be being achieved to the detriment of its quality and safety.