10.15.1 The fact that this sub-standard, unacceptable and potentially dangerous quality of construction simultaneously failed to be identified and rectified on so many different sites would suggest that the standard of wall construction in the industry may be a more widespread problem and not limited to the Edinburgh PPP1 schools.
10.15.2 The Inquiry sought information from each of the 32 Local Authorities in Scotland in order to understand whether the underlying cause of poor quality construction, and non-compliance with building standards or approved warrant drawings, in the construction of cavity walls was something that extended beyond the Edinburgh schools. The Local Authorities were asked to advise the Inquiry of any relevant information they held in relation to any similar recurrences to the problems of defective construction as experienced in Edinburgh or if anything of relevance had emerged as the outcome of precautionary investigations undertaken since they had been notified of the Edinburgh incident by the Scottish Futures Trust. The Inquiry first wrote seeking this information in August 2016. Most Local Authorities responded quickly and positively.
10.15.3 The Inquiry also sought from the SFT the collation of information that had been collected by them following the Edinburgh incident. The following is an extract from a letter received by the Inquiry from SFT in December 2016.
"Across Scotland, four related instances of partial wall collapse over the past four years have been reported to SFT, in addition to the Edinburgh PPP1 project. A number of Authorities have identified some issues with wall ties in similarly constructed buildings. The use of intrusive survey techniques such as the borescope, and the removal of individual bricks and blocks have been found to be the preferred methods for identifying similar issues. A number of Local Authorities have undertaken intrusive investigations, either following observed signs of distress on visual inspection, or directly following risk assessment of their building types. Where related issues have been identified, these have included:
• Minor structural observations such as deteriorating mortar bed joints and evidence of hairline settlement cracks in the building fabric which required minor precautionary remedial works;
• Instances where cavity walls have been built wider than specified or wider than would appear to have been the original design intent;
• Wall ties installed with depth of embedment in one or both leaves of cavity walls less than the recommended minimum;
• Number of wall ties or horizontal and vertical spacing of wall ties not according with normal standards;
• Wall ties around door and window openings not installed at closer centres as normal standards suggest;
• Walls not evidently tied to the main steel framed structure, including potentially inadequate or missing ties at the interface between head of wall and header beam and column supports - though it can be difficult to be clear whether head restraint had been required as part of the original design;
• Evidence of defects to blockwork walls particularly in large expansive panels in gymnasium/assembly halls and/or around wall mounted sports equipment."
10.15.4 The above information, while clearly identifying that similar problems had been found in other schools across Scotland, did not provide details on the frequency of these findings or where they were found. However, as stated in the letter, many Local Authorities, recognising the significance of the issue, were most helpful in providing comprehensive information directly to the Inquiry.
10.15.5 The level of information provided to the Inquiry by Local Authorities varied and, from the nature of the responses received, it was apparent that the level of investigations undertaken by different Local Authorities had also varied, from simply receiving statements of reassurance from Project Companies or contractors, to visual inspections of external walls to preliminary and follow-up intrusive testing.
10.15.6 There was an unwillingness on the part of some Local Authorities to provide copies of the structural reports that had been commissioned into their schools.
10.15.7 The Inquiry is of the view that while Local Authorities may not wish to have information on defects in their buildings publicised for various reasons, there should be a public duty on such organisations to openly share with each other and the construction industry, information on recurring defects of a type, which unless addressed by the construction industry and regulatory bodies, may present an on-going risk to the public they serve.
10.15.8 The risk of injury from falling masonry will be greatest in circumstances where defective masonry is present in larger panels that are not properly restrained or reinforced and are located higher up a building. In several of the following examples of defects described to the Inquiry by Local Authorities, it can be seen that, due to the recurring poor quality of wall construction, this risk was real.
10.15.9 The following information is based on a small selection of extracts taken from structural engineering reports voluntarily provided to the Inquiry by the relevant Local Authorities. These highlight the recurrence of a similarity of defects to those found in the Edinburgh PPP1 schools. The reports were commissioned by Local Authorities or by the relevant PPP companies, either following problems encountered with wall construction in newly built schools or as a precautionary follow-up after being informed of the Edinburgh wall collapse.
10.15.10 The reports indicate that the defects identified below in the various schools either have been fully addressed or are in the course of being addressed by the relevant Local Authority or its PPP Company.