12.1.1 The significance of this issue emerged over several weeks with further results of the evermore intrusive surveys throughout the 17 PPP1 projects revealing a widening range of defects with an increasingly widespread level of occurrence. Over that period, what had initially seemed to be a localised problem with one wall in one school, turned into one of the most demanding logistical tasks the Council may have ever faced.
12.1.2 Initially, the reasonable view taken by the Council officers was that the collapse of the wall at Oxgangs School was an isolated incident resulting from Storm Gertrude and a senior manager with a professional construction-related qualification from within the Council was allocated to directly manage the issue. This council officer would subsequently play a hugely effective role in the wider remediation process that was at this stage still unsuspected.
12.1.3 The school was closed with immediate effect, information was issued to parents, consultant engineers WRD were appointed to advise the Council and temporary works were designed and carried out to the wall to render it safe. The school was able to reopen within a matter of only three days including a weekend.
12.1.4 Additionally, a precautionary programme of visual inspections of all the PPP1 schools was commissioned to seek to identify any signs of damage or stress to the external walls of rest of the PPP1 the schools. This investigation raised no such concerns.
12.1.5 Once the immediate practical objective had been completed of seeking to ensure a safe environment at Oxgangs and the other schools, a detailed report on the reason for the collapse of the wall was sought from WRD, whose appointment had been transferred to ESP as owners of the schools.
12.1.6 It is the view of the Inquiry that, despite the unavoidable disruption and inconvenience caused, the response to the initial collapse of the wall by the Council was prompt, effective and appropriate in the known circumstances at the time.
12.1.7 It was only subsequently, when the possible extent of the defective construction was identified through further surveys, that it was recognised that there could be a requirement for closure of some or all of the schools.
12.1.8 On the 18th March 2016, the Chief Executive responded to concerns expressed in emerging survey information, which reported that the presence of defective embedment of wall ties was not limited to the gable wall at Oxgangs and had been discovered in the other Phase 2 schools. He declared the situation should be considered as a 'serious incident' and established and instigated daily meetings of a Corporate Incident Management Team (CIMT), with senior representation from all the relevant sections of the Council.
12.1.9 This team supported the Chief Executive in developing the strategic response and directing the operational management of the situation as it evolved in response to the constantly changing information being received from ESP.
12.1.10 It is evident to the Inquiry from the minutes of the meetings of the CIMT and from the evidence provided by Council witnesses that at all times the key central objective of the Council was to protect the safety of pupils and staff and that this factor was the underlying consideration in relation to all decisions taken by the Council throughout the process. The establishment of the CIMT and the role it played was critical in providing a fully coordinated management response to the situation.