The aspects discussed above should be relevant for information about the production processes and strategic choices of the private-sector party. The disclosure cost in terms of potential competitive harm for the private-sector party should therefore be small or absent when disclosure is limited to contractual terms (payment schemes, quality standards, deductions, prices, etc.) and other output-related measures (revenues).
However, since PPP contracts are based on output specifications and the assessment and selection phases are in the past, from a PPP governance perspective the most important contractual information that needs to be disclosed once the contract is signed is exactly that about output variables. Moreover, information should be disclosed within a pre-established, short, and binding time limit from its emergence. The time limit could be established by law, by the national auditor, and/or by the contract, but in any case it must be short and strictly binding (Iossa, Spagnollo, Vellez; 2007).
Communication strategies should be an integral part of any PPP project and made explicit, especially within politically sensitive areas. Communication about PPPs is a never-ending process, and information that can be shared without jeopardizing the intellectual property rights of the private sector should be shared. The opposition to PPP projects should not be allowed to provide an unbalanced portrayal of what the project means for the public. All partners should be involved in the process of communication strategies included in the contract, and public and private partners should cooperate on a common communications strategy framework. This will ensure a consistent message, and reduce potential confusion. Fairness and confidentiality should be ensured throughout the process. Information disclosure on how the project affects the reported fiscal balance and public debt, and whether PPP assets are recognized as assets in the government balance sheet is crucial. The emphasis is on ensuring that PPP assets are effectively accounted for and not kept in limbo.
Extensive theory and experience in PPPs converge in the principle that the disclosure of information and its management should be taken with special care, particularly when designing the contracts. First, the inclusion of commercial confidentiality clauses reduces transparency and negatively impact public accountability. A second area relates to potential problems that arise from a reduced scrutiny, which creates opportunities for corruption and patronage. Third, part of the 'standard' package of public sector reforms in PPPs often includes legislative changes on how to include freedom of information legislation, which sometimes paradoxically limit the citizens' opportunity to access public information. The asymmetric information held by private partners may increase their knowledge about the public contract manager, which can lead to public interest challenges.
If good communication strategies consider trust as the core of commercial confidentiality regimes, it can alienate public stakeholders and their potential to identify problems and help in developing solutions. Therefore commercial confidentiality clauses need to be minimized in contract designs. In reality the existence of asymmetric information has also created problems on distributional equity. The private party might 'cherry-pick' clients leaving the public sector to deal with less profitable clients or activities. In extreme situations, asymmetric information might enable the private partner to know much more about the business than the government does, thereby constituting another problem of public knowledge.