| III. PAYMENT MECHANISM | Yes/No | Comments |
| 15. Are the required service standards based on output specifications? | ||
| 16. Are all these service standards easily monitorable and verifiable? | ||
| 17. If not, are other objective measures of performance specified? | ||
| 18. Are customer satisfaction surveys used to monitor performance of the private-sector party? | ||
| 19. If yes, are customer satisfaction surveys carried out by an independent third party? | ||
| 20. Does the contract exhibit a consistent link between output specifications, risk allocation and incentives, and the payment mechanism? | ||
| 21. Is the payment mechanism consistent with the allocation of risks between the public and private parties, and hence with the incentives given to the private-sector party? | ||
| 22. Is the payment due to the private-sector party conditional on service provision? | ||
| 23. Does the contract specify a service commencement day after which the first payment is made? | ||
| 24. Does the public-sector party impose sufficient contractual protections from delays in service commencement, like robust deductions and liquidated damages? | ||
| 25. If the payment mechanism is based on user charges, does the tariff level ensure the bankability of the project? | ||
| 26. Does the level of tariff discourage demand, particularity if there is an alternative free-available service? | ||
| 27. Are there provisions to combine user charges with any form of subvention from the public-sector party? | ||
| 28. Do these subventions depend on the private-sector performance, like subventions based on the number of users? | ||
| 29. Is the private-sector party allowed to collect secondary revenues, like advertisement, food services, etc.? | ||
| 30. If the revenues collected by the private-sector party turn out to be higher than expected, are there mechanisms to limit the private sector profits, like sharing surplus revenues? | ||
| 31. If the payment mechanism is based on usage, is the definition of service usage measurable and observable, like traffic volumes? | ||
| 32. Is the usage payment capped for high levels of usage? | ||
| 33. Does the payment mechanism include bonuses or deductions according to availability of the service and/or performance targets? | ||
| 34. Do deductions vary according to the severity of the availability/performance failure? | ||
| 35. Does the contract include clear rectification periods providing the private-sector party with clear deadlines within which to rectify the failures to avoid additional and increasing deductions? | ||
| 36. Do deduction payments use a ratchet mechanism where deductions increase with the duration and frequency of the failure? |