In some circumstances, the ability of PPPs to create incentives to improve maintenance will be limited. This may be the case:
• In user-pays PPPs where the PPP company is a monopoly provider, or for government-pays PPPs, if quality and safety standards are not carefully specified, monitored, and enforced. Engel, Fischer, and Galetovic [#74] note the importance of effective monitoring to achieving the potential benefit of improved maintenance
• If the contractor does not have much equity or other financial stake in the project, meaning it would rather walk away from a contract than spend on costly maintenance. This risk is described further in Section 1.4.2: Considerations for Government, on the danger of over-leveraged projects
• Towards the end of the contract, when the contractor knows it will not reap the benefit of further maintenance investments.
These limitations can be mitigated through good contract design, as described further in Section 3.4: Designing PPP Contracts.
| Key References: Infrastructure Challenges and How PPPs Can Help | |
| Reference | Description |
| Foster, V. & C. Briceño-Garmendia (eds.) (2010) Africa's Infrastructure: A Time for Transformation, Washington, DC: World Bank French Version: Infrastructures africaines: Une transformation impérative | Presents the results of the Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic (AICD) study, a comprehensive review of infrastructure sectors in Africa. Details the challenges facing infrastructure provision in Africa, with information on performance by sector |
| Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (2007) Infrastructure to 2030 Volume 2: Mapping Policy for Electricity, Water and Transport, Paris, France: OECD French Version: Les infrastructures à l'horizon 2030 (Volume 2): Electricité, eau et transports : quelles politiques? | Presents the results of a "global infrastructure needs" study, reviewing trends and challenges in the electricity, water, and transport sectors, and providing policy recommendations. Includes estimates of infrastructure needs in OECD economies, as well as considering the role of PPP in meeting those needs |
| Bent Flyvbjerg, Mette Holm & Søren Buhl (2002) Underestimating Costs in Public Works Project: Error or Lie? Journal of the American Planning Association, 68(3) 279-295 | This global study of 258 transport projects finds that, on average, actual costs were 28 percent higher than planned costs-65 percent higher for projects outside Europe and North America. The paper describes technical, psychological, and political explanations for this result |
| Bent Flyvbjerg, Mette Holm & Søren Buhl (2005) How (In)accurate Are Demand Forecasts in Public Works Projects? The Case of Transportation, Journal of the American Planning Association, 71(2) 131-146 | This study of 210 transport projects in 14 countries finds that traffic was over-estimated for nine out of ten rail projects, by an average of 106 percent. The accuracy of traffic forecasts also varies for roads, but on average road traffic was found to be under-estimated |
| Bent Flyvbjerg (2007) Policy and Planning for Large Infrastructure Projects: Problems, Causes, and Cures, Environment and Planning B: Planning and Design, 34, 578-597 | Summarizes the results and lessons from the above studies, and other similar work-why estimates of costs and benefits are inaccurate for large infrastructure projects |
| Tanzi, V. & H. Davoodi (1998) Roads to Nowhere: How Corruption in Public Investment Hurts Growth (Economic Issues 12) Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund | Drawing on cross-country analysis, argues that corruption reduces growth, by increasing public investment while reducing its productivity-increasing investment expenditure, but with lower expenditure on operations and maintenance |
| World Bank (2008) Deterring Corruption and Improving Governance in the Water Supply & Sanitation Sector: A Sourcebook | Chapter 6 describes the problems of corruption in planning and implementing major capital projects |
| Advisory Council for the American Society of Civil Engineers (2009) 2009 Report Card for America's Infrastructure, Washington, D.C. | Assigns "grades" and describes the state of different types of infrastructure in the United States. Includes estimates of the cost to users and government of the poor standard of maintenance |
| PricewaterhouseCoopers (2005) Delivering the PPP Promise: A Review of PPP Issues and Activity, London | Section 2 succinctly describes the advantages and disadvantages of using PPPs |
| Eggers, W. D. & T. Startup (2006) Closing the Infrastructure Gap: The Role of Public-Private Partnerships, New York: Deloitte | Examines the case for PPPs, describing the typical benefits of PPP over traditional procurement. Also reviews how PPP markets typically develop, considering PPP experience in several sectors (with a focus on developed countries) |
| Eduardo Engel, Ronald Fischer & Alexander Galetovic (2008) Public-Private Partnerships: When and How, IDEAS, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile, Documento de Trabajo 257 | Describes the circumstances under which PPPs may provide better value than traditional public procurement, as well as examining some common but weak arguments for PPPs. Also describes institutional requirements for a successful PPP program |
| Ronald Fischer (2011) The Promise and Peril of PPPs: Lessons from the Chilean Experience, Working Paper 11/0483, London School of Economics | Uses the experience of Chile and other developing countries to examine the benefits and pitfalls of PPPs, also offering recommendations to address common problems |
| Tim Irwin (2007) Government Guarantees Allocating and Valuing Risk in Privately Financed Infrastructure Projects, World Bank | Chapter 2 describes "lessons from history" of government guarantees to private infrastructure projects, with cautionary tales of governments thereby creating significant fiscal exposure. Chapter 3 describes why governments can make bad decisions on providing guarantees |
| Abrantes de Sousa, M. (2011) Managing PPPs for Budget Sustainability: The Case of PPPs in Portugal, from Problems to Solutions, ppplusofonia blogspot, October 30, 2011 | Describes Portugal's PPP experience, including the rapid adoption of PPP, without strong fiscal control, and the associated fiscal risk. Also considers how better management of PPPs could contribute to resolving Portugal's external debt problems |
| House of Lords, Select Committee on Economic Affairs (2010) Private Finance Projects and Off-Balance Sheet Debt (HL Paper 63-I) London | Summarizes the results of the Select Committee's inquiry into the use of PFI. Describes the United Kingdom's PFI program, how the value for money of PFI projects is assessed, and evidence from witnesses and reports on the results of PFI in practice |
| House of Lords, Select Committee on Economic Affairs (2010) Government Response to Private Finance Projects and Off-Balance Sheet Debt (HL Paper 114) London | Sets out HM Treasury's response to the Select Committee's report, providing further detail and commentary on the practices and results of PFI in the United Kingdom |
| Gupta, P., P. Gupta & T. Netzer (2009) Building India: Accelerating Infrastructure Projects, Mumbai, India: McKinsey and Company | Describes bottlenecks in infrastructure provision in India, and possible solutions, including highlighting some of the benefits of PPPs |
| National Audit Office (2003) PFI: Construction Performance, Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General HC 371, Session 2002-2003, 5 February, London | Compares PFI projects in the United Kingdom with an earlier survey of publicly-procured construction projects, and found a higher proportion of PFI projects come in on time and on budget |
| National Audit Office (NAO) (2009) Performance of PFI Construction, London | Updates previous report, adding experience to 2008 |
| Infrastructure Partnerships Australia (2007) Performance of PPPs and Traditional Procurement in Australia, Sydney, Australia | Compares 21 PPP projects with 33 traditionally-procured infrastructure projects, finding that on average, PPPs have lower cost overruns and delays |
| Colin Duffield (2008) Report on the Performance of PPP Projects in Australia when compared with a representative sample of traditionally procured infrastructure projects, Melbourne, Australia: University of Melbourne | Compares 25 PPP projects with 42 traditionally-procured projects' cost and time performance over a series of project milestones |
| Gassner, K., A. Popov & N. Pushak (2009) Does Private Sector Participation Improve Performance in Electricity and Water Distribution?, Trends and Policy Options, No 6, World Bank | A comprehensive econometric analysis of more than 1,200 utilities in 71 developing and transition countries. Found that private sector participation improved efficiency and service levels |
| Marin, P. (2009) Public-Private Partnerships for Urban Water Utilities: A Review of Experience in Developing Countries (Trends and Policy Options No. 8) World Bank | Reviews the experience of 65 PPPs in the water sector in developing countries, finding consistent improvements in efficiency and service quality |
| Jose Luis Guasch (2004) Granting and Renegotiating Infrastructure Concessions: Doing it Right, World Bank | Describes in detail how poor PPP design and weak implementation can lead to renegotiations and increased costs. Based on a review of experience in Latin America and the Caribbean, where a high proportion of PPPs underwent renegotiation within a short time from contract close |
| Frauendorfer, R. & R. Liemberger (2010) The Issues and Challenges of Reducing Non-Revenue Water, Manila, Philippines: Asian Development Bank | The section on "outsourcing of non-revenue water management activities" (pages 34-37) describes how performance-based contracts can be used to help improve maintenance standards |