1 For information about the BPP project, see its website at http://bpp.worldbank.org.
2 World Bank 2014.
3 Straub 2008; Calderón and Servén 2004, 2008, 2010.
4 The infrastructure gap is defined as the difference between what is invested in infrastructure and what is needed to achieve the economy's development goals.
5 World Bank 2016.
6 As defined by the World Bank PPP CCSA.
7 World Bank 2016.
8 Estache and Saussier 2014.
9 See, for instance, Yescombe 2013; Yong 2010; EPEC 2011.
10 In 2015, the Benchmarking PPP Procurement project was successfully piloted in 10 economies: Cameroon, Colombia, the Arab Republic of Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Peru, South Africa, Tanzania, and Tunisia. The report can be found at the Benchmarking PPP Procurement website (http://bpp.worldbank.org/ reports) and the PPP Knowledge Lab website (http://www.pppknowledgelab.org).
11 The ECG comprises leading PPP legal experts and other PPP practitioners from many organizations, among them the World Bank Group, including both the World Bank and International Finance Corporation; the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development; the Inter-American Development Bank; the Asian Development Bank; the Islamic Development Bank; The George Washington University; American University; Georgetown University; the University of Central Florida; and the Maxwell School of Public Administration.
12 The selection criteria for identifying the 82 economies were (a) economies covered in the pilot assessment, (b) economies with active PPP markets (measured by number of projects reaching financial close in the preceding 10 years according to the World Bank's Private Participation in Infrastructure Database http://ppi.worldbank.org), (c) economies with ongoing work programs on PPPs with the World Bank Group, (d) Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility priority economies, (e) priority economies identified by other multilateral development banks, and (f) economies covered by the Benchmarking PPP Procurement initiative, which makes it possible to tap into the existing network of contributors and increase the survey response rate.
13 Points are awarded on the basis of whether something is done in practice, as well as whether that practice is codified in the law. More points are awarded to an economy if the practice is codified in law. This approach rewards economies that systematically codify their rules and practices.
14 See the APMG Public-Private Partnership (PPP) Certification Guide website at https://ppp-certification.com/sites/default/files/documents/Chapter-2-Establishing-a-PPP-Framework.pdf.
15 Yong 2010, 32.
16 Brazil, article 2, Law no. 11,079/2004 (PPP law).
17 France, article 5, Ordinance no. 2016-65, dated January 29, 2016.
18 When referring to the number of economies following or not following specific practices in the stages of the PPP procurement cycle, counting of these five economies will be based on the practices and regulatory frameworks for PPPs in the strictest sense. Noticeable differences from the framework for concessions will be presented throughout the text when relevant.
19 In these economies, PPP guidelines constitute the most specific source of guidance for the development of PPP projects. Other relevant laws and regulations might also apply if they are in place (for example, public procurement laws, public financial management laws, and so on).
20 Uruguay, article 3, Law 18.786, adopted July 19, 2011.
21 OECD 2010, 11.
22 Honduras, article 13 of Legislative Decree 143 of 2010, the Public-Private Partnership Promotion Law.
23 Arab Republic of Egypt, article 16, Law no. 67 of 2010 regulating Partnership with the Private Sector in Infrastructure Projects, Services, and Public Utilities, and article 2, PPP Executive Regulations of Law no. 67 of 2010, issued in Prime Ministerial Decree no. 238 of 2011.
24 Delmon 2011.
25 Ibid.
26 OECD 2012.
27 Arab Republic of Egypt, articles 14 and 15(e), Law no. 67 of 2010 promulgating the Law Regulating Partnership with the Private Sector in Infrastructure Projects, Services, and Public Utilities, and articles 3 and 4, PPP Executive Regulations of Law no. 67 of 2010, issued in Prime Ministerial Decree no. 238 of 2011.
28 World Bank 2014, section 2.3.1.
29 Philippines, section 2.3, BOT Law, Act no. (RA) 6957, "An Act Authorizing the Financing, Construction, Operation and Maintenance of Infrastructure Projects by the Private Sector and for Other Purposes," as amended by RA 7718.
30 Kenya, sections 2, 24, and 25, Public Private Partnerships Act no. 15 of 2013.
31 Peru, article 7.1, Legislative Decree no. 1012, published on May 13, 2008, as modified by Law no. 30167, published on March 2, 2014. The legislation approves the framework law of PPPs for the generation of employment and dictates rules for expediting the private investment promotion processes.
32 Pakistan, section K.i.a., Public Procurement Policy as approved by the Economic Coordination Committee of the Cabinet, dated January 26, 2010.
33 World Bank 2014, box 3.3.
34 For a guide to the design and evaluation of investment projects, see OPP (2014).
35 Cameroon, section 8, Decree no. 2008/0115.
36 Argentina, article 13, Decree no. 967/2005.
37 In Moldova, according to section 28 of Government Resolution no. 476, if the PPP project is initiated by the government in such a way that implementation requires the participation of the state budget, the feasibility study is submitted to the Ministry of Finance for examination and assessment of project sustainability.
38 Timor-Leste, article 8, Decree Law no. 42/2012 of September 7, 2012, as amended by Decree Law no. 2/2014 of January 15, 2014, regulating the Legal Regime on Public-Private Partnerships.
39 Chile, article 40, Financial Management Law, D.L. no. 1.263 de 1975.
40 The text of the manual is available at http://www.minhacienda.gov.co/HomeMinhacienda/ShowProperty?nodeId=%2FOCS%2FMIG_6047857.PDF%2F%2FidcPrimaryFile&revision=latestreleased.
41 Chapter 1, section 2, of the Arab Republic of Egypt's PPP Guidelines on the PPP Structure.
42 ICC 2014.
43 For examples, see the guides at the following websites: https://colaboracion.dnp.gov.co/CDT/Participacin%20privada%20en%20proyectos%20de%20infraestructu/Guia%20de%20APP%20%20 Capitulo%203%202016.pdf and https://www.dnp.gov.co/programas/participación-privada-%20y-en-proyectos-de-infraestructura/asociaciones-publico-privadas/Paginas/guias-app.aspx.
44 Brazil, article 10.I, General Law for Public-Private Partnerships, Federal Law no. 11,079 of 2004.
45 Philippines, section 4.5(d), PPP Governing Board Policy Circular no. 01-2015.
46 Reeves, Palcic, and Flannery 2013.
47 World Bank 2010.
48 No provision regulates this matter for PPPs in Cambodia, Cameroon, Gabon, Papua New Guinea, Togo, and Uganda.
49 World Bank 2004.
50 EPEC 2011.
51 For example, Argentina, Armenia, Bulgaria, Ghana, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Poland, Romania, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Uganda, and Ukraine.
52 The 13 economies are Canada, China, the Arab Republic of Egypt, India, Indonesia, Lebanon, Nigeria, the Philippines, South Africa, Tajikistan, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Zambia.
53 Arab Republic of Egypt, article 81, PPP Executive Regulations.
54 Nigeria, section 5, Infrastructure Concession Regulatory Commission Act of 2005.
55 Nigeria, section 111, Procurement Regulation (procurement of goods and works).
56 UNCITRAL 2001, section 119.
57 Summaries of the PPP contract present provisions pertaining to the object and conditions of the project, its term, and performance requirements, as well as a summary of the monitoring system.
58 World Bank 2013.
59 Farquharson, Torres de Mästle, and Yescombe 2011.
60 Hodges and Dellacha 2007.
61 World Bank 2014.
62 According to paragraph 3.2 of the ICRC Guidelines for Implementing Unsolicited Proposals for PPPs in Nigeria, the procedure is as follows:
(1) The USP is submitted to and reviewed by the relevant ministry, department, or agency (MDA) with oversight for the relevant sector.
(2) The MDA is required to review the proposal to determine that it meets the following criteria: (a) the project serves a credible public interest, (b) the project is in line with the national development goals of the relevant MDA; (c) the project falls within the category of critical infrastructure, (d) the project is viable and does not require viability gap funding, and (e) the project proponent possesses the requisite competence and profile to implement the project.
(3) Following the review of the proposal by the MDA, the unsolicited proposal is forwarded to the ICRC for its review and issuance of "no objection," if the proposal is satisfactory.
(4) Technical and financial due diligence will be carried out to ascertain the capability of the project proponent in implementing the project, if selected.
(5) Following the issuance of "no objection" from the ICRC and success of the project proponent from the due diligence exercise, the proposal may then be approved at the ministerial level.
(6) The project proponent is issued a formal acknowledgment as the project author, and the project moves to a competitive bidding stage.
(7) Following the competitive procurement process (expression of interest, request for proposal, and so forth), the project proponent is then requested to submit a best and final offer, along with the preferred bidder.
(8) The successful bidder is then determined by the most economically and financially viable submission
63 Uganda, section 34(5), PPP Act.
64 Hodges and Dellacha 2007.
65 Ibid.
66 Peru, article 16, PPP law; article 31, PPP regulations.
67 Jamaica, section 9.0.3.3, PPP policy.
68 Albania, article 22(4), Law no. 125/2013.
69 World Bank 2014.
70 World Bank 2012.
71 The ABFO compensation mechanism is used in the context of two-stage bid processes. In this procurement procedure, the higher-ranked bidders from the first stage are invited to participate in the second stage when the final private partner is selected. Through the ABFO mechanism, the original proponent of the USP is automatically included in the second stage of the bidding process.
72 When a developer's fee is used, the original proponent is reimbursed for some or all of the USP development costs either by the government or by the winning bidder.
73 With a bid bonus, the original proponent is given a premium to his or her offer during the competitive bidding procedure.
74 Under a Swiss challenge system, once the relevant authority accepts the USP, a competitive bidding procedure commences. If the original proponent is unsuccessful or if there is a better offer in place, the original proponent has the option of submitting a counteroffer to match or beat the offer from the best bidder. The Swiss challenge is very useful in a tender procedure when price is the only award criterion.
75 World Bank 2014, 156-57.
76 World Bank 2014, 208, para. 3.7.2.
77 Only Armenia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Iraq, Lebanon, Nicaragua, and Papua New Guinea do not explicitly establish a monitoring and evaluation system for PPP contracts.
78 Colombia, article 33, PPP law.
79 Costa Rica, articles 36 and 37, concessions law, and article 48, concessions regulations; Ecuador, article 9, PPP law.
80 Exactly half (41) of the surveyed economies have a regulatory provision or an established practice of designing a PPP procurement team. In the other half, no provision or established practice exists in this regard.
81 Within the context of project management, risk mitigation involves (a) establishing a risk progress monitoring system to track identified risk and identify new risks appearing as the project develops and (b) planning actions to minimize the threats to the project's objectives that the identified risks imply (adapted from Project Management Institute 2001).
82 Australia, appendix H.3, National PPP Guidelines, vol. 2.
83 World Bank 2014, 211, para 3.7.3.
84 Guasch 2004.
85 Ibid.
86 The economies that did not appear to embody explicit regulatory provisions on PPP contract renegotiation included Algeria, Armenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Congo, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ecuador, Gabon, Guatemala, Honduras, India, Lebanon, Malawi, Malaysia, Myanmar, Nicaragua, Pakistan, and Papua New Guinea.
87 See, for instance, article 41 of the Cambodian law on concessions, which requires the approval of the Ministry of Economy and Finance to modify the concessions contract, and article 57 of the Costa Rican concession law, which provides that the comptroller general must approve any extension to the contract.
88 See, for example, the obligatory approval of both the Federal and Ontario Province Treasury Boards in Canada, according to section 12.9.1 of the Federal Contracting Policies and section 5.8.5 of the Ontario Procurement Directives.
89 See, for example, the obligatory approval of both the Federal and Ontario Province Treasury Boards in Canada, according to section 12.9.1 of the Federal Contracting Policies and section 5.8.5 of the Ontario Procurement Directives.
90 The complete list of economies is as follows: Albania, Australia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, France, Jordan, Mexico, Moldova, Morocco, Peru, the Philippines, Portugal, Romania, South Africa, the United Kingdom, and Uganda.
91 South Africa, Treasury Regulation 16.8.2.
92 UNCITRAL 2001, 173, para 1.
93 Ibid.
94 These economies are Afghanistan, Armenia, Colombia, Ghana, Jamaica, Lebanon, Malaysia, Nicaragua, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Portugal, and the Russian Federation.
95 Chile, articles 35, 36, and 36 bis, concession law.
96 Guatemala, article 95, PPP law.
97 Uruguay, article 54, PPP law.
98 Points are awarded on the basis of whether something is done in practice, as well as whether that practice is codified in the law. More points are awarded to an economy if the practice is codified in the law. This approach rewards the economies that systematically codify their rules and practices.