Some survey participants insisted that government and industry need to acknowledge when they get things wrong, and honestly explore what happened. The NAO has published excellent reports over the years on competition and contract management, but these are released into a highly adversarial environment, and the scope for learning and improvement is limited as a result.
Occasional government inquiries are not well-suited for this purpose either, since they have limited terms of reference, and they exist for only a brief period of time. There are relatively few academics who have dedicated themselves to the study of public service contracting: it is surprising, given the scale and the significance of the UK public service economy, that there has not been a great deal more research over the years.
Compared with the literature on the management of the firm, the applied literature on procurement, contract negotiation and contract management is quite small. A micro-economist is awarded the Nobel Prize for the theoretical analysis of prison contracting, while the operation of public service contracts in the UK over a quarter of a century remains largely unstudied. Auction theory and algebraic formulae are no substitute for field research and fail to explain many of the real-world problems encountered in government contracting.
The literature on market design and stewardship is smaller again. Alvin Roth was awarded his Nobel Prize for 'the practice of market design', and his work on matching markets is applied as well as theoretical. While he has popularised the concept of market design among economists, he is working with only one particular kind of market - the clearing house.114
In spite of the growing popularity of individual budgets and vouchers across the developed world, and a considerable literature about their use in individual sectors, there are only a handful of books which explore the architecture of choice-based markets for public services. This makes it difficult for civil servants charged with developing a voucher scheme in an entirely new service area.
For the most part, the literature on corporate supply chains is highly technical, and provides little guidance to policymakers charged with designing a supply chain for government.
Consideration should be given to the establishment of a centre of excellence somewhere in the UK for the applied study of public service contracting, and the design and operation of public service markets. This would work best if it was funded jointly by government and industry, and there was a clear commitment to the centre's independence and longevity. The objective should be to undertake detailed research into real-world markets, contracts and procurements, studying the experience of both sides, and extracting the lessons without laying blame on individual parties. It follows that for such an institution to work, it would need to enjoy the absolute trust of both government and industry.
One of the survey participants observed that if only a miniscule proportion of the money that has been wasted on flawed procurements and failed contracts in recent years were dedicated to such an institution, it would be well funded indeed.