Key issues / challenges:

There is clearly a link between the choice of decision-makers' practical approach for achieving VfM through contract management oversight (see VfM section above) and the organisational culture shared between public and private sector partners. For instance, the give and take-type approach accords with a culture that places a premium on quality of the contract management function as well as embracing a solutions-based approach (PT03 and PT13) fostered through a strong belief in the value of relationship management (PF07 and PF01) - one where partners are likely to be flexible (PT05) and pull together for mutual benefit when things go wrong or when unexpected issues arise (PT13 and PT03). This contrasts with a 'black letter' approach which is likely to manifest in a strong compliance-orientated culture. According to PF06, establishing such a culture is acceptable if government is "100 per cent" certain that the contract is correct; however, in practice, this is unlikely to be the case as the interviewee acknowledges that there is often room for wider interpretation of contractual clauses.

Despite the goodwill that can be generated by PPP partners and the co-operative intentions they may have, it is also argued that "you get what you pay for"i.e. that money drives behaviour (RK01). This suggests that organisational culture may not always be driven primarily by the preferred contract management style of the public partner and can be influenced by the size of the private partner's financial margins, which could then influence the extent to which the concessionaire may 'go the extra mile' (or perhaps alternatively, the degree to which 'corners could be cut' by the operator). The wider point is elucidated by PF13:

"If you've got a deal where the private sector is basically making dollars but Is still delivering VfM, then there's probably a greater willingness to do things together. But if the assumptions that the private sector has made around the cost of delivering the services and the services are actually under pressure and it becomes a bit of a loss, then their motivation to work in flexible ways is going to diminish".

This is what PF01 may have been referring to with regard to the expression, "uphill battle"in context of the public partner attempting to deliver the full value of a PPP contract over time. There is also potential for these types of difficulties to be exacerbated, for instance, by budgetary pressures and changing departmental priorities that can impact on the quality of the public partner's contract management function e.g. where cost-cutting may lead to the replacement of highly qualified staff by less skilled and experienced employees. As a consequence, the dynamics of the relationship between the parties may change and the strategic relationships may even become more of a routine administrative process (PF07 and PT03).

For Social Infrastructure projects, interviewees also identify the importance of effective internal government stakeholder management with public sector operators. For example, and in terms of the provision of health services, a "conduit" (PF09) is employed by a hospital (as a representative of the state) to work with the private sector facility manager to resolve day-to-day maintenance issues under the concession agreement (PT10). This type of role essentially involves regularly meeting with hospital team leaders, communicating problems to the facility manager and monitoring the facility manager's progress in resolving these matters. This differs from the function of the public partner's contract management team which ought to be largely concerned with dealing with strategic partnering issues such as suspected or confirmed instances of private partner under-performance (PF09). From a public partner perspective, challenges for the contact management team may arise if these ancillary stakeholders do not have a sufficient grasp of the contractual framework and how they should best deal with private partner representatives (PT03). RK05 offers the following hypothetical example:

"If there is a government operator moving from an environment that they are used to into a PPP building, they won't understand very well the nature of the PPP and the fact that if 'the light is not working': a) you don't actually have to fix it yourself. You can call the helpdesk and the PPP [facility manager] will take care of that; and b) in fact if you try and fix it yourself, in a small way, you are potentially undermining the contract. There can be a bit of behavioural change needed from that perspective".