Although abatement (including the threat of abatement) can be an effective method for driving private partner behaviour (PF13) by providing a strong incentive to perform under the contractual framework (PT06), interviewees PT06, PT10 and PF07 reason that the decision to apply abatement for under-performance is a matter of professional judgement. For example, and in the experience of PT10, abatement should only be applied if there is an intractable problem between the partners i.e. after all reasonable avenues for resolving the issue have been exhausted. Although this may be a contentious view (see 'Value-for-Money' and 'Organisational culture' sections above), PF08 provides context in support of PT10's perspective:
"One needs to be careful [about applying] abatement given that you need to nurture a 25 year relationship with [a] project company. For this reason, abatement should be [used as] an [enforcement tool] of last resort, not [as a] first resort".
Interviewee PT06 provides insights along a similar line:
"If you know that the facility manager is doing everything he can to alleviate or address whatever issues are cropping up, then why would you abate, even if you're entitled to under the contract? It doesn't serve any purpose. You have a right to abate, and...the state has a very big stick, but you want to use it wisely. If you abate them, it hurts them financially but the relationship is important and it's about give and take".
In other words, knowing when to apply abatement and when to allow flexibility can be strategically important with respect to building and maintaining effective partnership relations (PF13, PF07, PF02, RK05 and RK11). Moreover, there is some anecdotal evidence within Australia, that instead of applying abatement, partners occasionally do deals to off-set under-performance, for instance, where the private partner may informally consent to do other things to compensate (PT04 and PF02) e.g. agreeing to scope changes (PT04). However, taking these types of decisions is likely to reduce transparency in decision-making (PF02) as well as reduce the effectiveness of threatening abatement for future instances of under-performance (PT04). Other consequences of such decision-making may manifest in informal precedent being claimed (PF13) and could potentially lead to intended VfM outcomes being compromised (PT04).